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There are hundreds of thousands of crude oil and natural gas wells across North
America that are currently not producing oil or gas. Many of these wells have not
been permanently decommissioned to meet environmental standards for permanent
closure, but are in an inactive state that enables them to be more easily reactivated.
Some of these wells have been in this inactive state for more than sixty years which
begs the question of whether they will ever contribute to our energy supply, or
whether they are being left inactive because the environmental remediation costs
are prohibitively high. I estimate a structural model of optimal well operations over
time and under uncertainty to determine what conditions or policies might push
any of the inactive wells out of the hysteresis in which they reside. The model is
further used to forecast production from existing wells and recoverable reserves from
existing pools. The estimation uses data on production decisions from 84 thousand
conventional oil and gas wells and estimates of the remaining reserves of 47 thousand
pools. As the producer’s decision depends on their subjective belief for how prices
and recoverable reserves change over time, I also estimate the probability of changes
in prices and recovery technology. I model increases and decreases in the estimated
recoverable reserves to depend on price, and predict that natural gas reserves are
more responsive to changes in price than conventional oil reserves. Under high prices
there is potential for large increases in gas reserves, however this is not the case for
oil reserves when the oil price is high. And likewise, under low prices, gas reserves
decrease more than oil reserves.
The dynamic programming model predicts that with only a drastic, arguably
implausible, increase in prices and recovery rates will there be a significant increase
in the number of inactive wells that are reactivated. If ideal conditions are not
enough to induce well reactivation then this implies that typically wells are left
inactive not because of the option to reactivate, but rather because the cost of
environmental cleanup is too high. Should there be externalities from idling the
wells (such as continued contamination of groundwater) that are not accounted for
in the decision, then this behavior may not be socially optimal. The model predicts
that a Pigouvian tax on inactive wells would have the added benefit of inciting the
reactivation of oil and gas wells, however in the case of oil, a tax would incite more
wells to be decommissioned than reactivated.
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1 Introduction
Currently, there are hundreds of thousands of oil and gas wells scattered across
North America that are inactive. Some of these wells have not produced any oil or
gas in the last 60 years, but they also have not been permanently decommissioned1
under the claim that they will be reactivated some day. Different jurisdictions
across the United States and Canada have different ways of ensuring wells are de-
commissioned at the end of their productive lives so that environmental damage is
remediated and avoided. Unlike jurisdictions that limit the time that a well can be
left inactive before it is decommissioned, in Alberta, Canada, the decision of when
to declare that a well has reached the end of its productive life is left up to the
operator and there is no limit to the length of time that a well can be left inactive.
By allowing the producer to decide when to decommission its wells, the option for
future production is preserved so that the wells can be readily reactivated should
prices or technology improve. However preserving the option to reactivate comes
with a social cost. Leaving a well inactive without proper decommissioning increases
the risk of contamination of the atmosphere, drinking water, vegetation and soil,
lost productivity of other wells in the same pool and even explosions [Kubichek
et al., 1997, Williams et al., 2000]. There is also the risk that the producer will
declare bankruptcy before undertaking the expense of the environmental cleanup.
Texas, for example, has roughly 10,000 orphaned wells for this reason[RRC, 2006].
The cleanup costs associated with decommissioning in Alberta range from $20,000
1Here, to permanently decommission a well is to plug and abandon it, and to reclaim the
surrounding land.
1
to several million dollars per well[Orphan], whereas the cost that a producer must
pay to keep a well inactive is usually only a payment to the owner of the surface
rights (typically around $1500 per year [Marriott, 2001]). In 2009 the Government
of Alberta announced plans to spend $30 million dollars in the cleanup of 600 or-
phaned wells [ABGovt, 2009]. As there are over 225,000 conventional oil and gas
wells in Alberta that will eventually need to be decommissioned, examining the
factors that influence this decision is a worthwhile endeavor. This dissertation ex-
amines the probability that wells will be reactivated or decommissioned as well as
the resulting production of oil and natural gas should they be reactivated. This
examination sheds light not only on the extent of the liability that has accumulated
by not decommissioning inactive wells, but also on the future oil and gas supply
from existing conventional wells.
To determine how likely it is that the inactive wells will ever be productive
or not, I propose the following three steps: (1) model the producer’s decision for
the optimal operating state of a well (active, inactive or decommissioned) over time
and under uncertainty, (2) estimate the structural parameters in the model, (3) use
the model to simulate a producer’s reaction to counterfactual scenarios, to see what
conditions would result in wells being reactivated. I model the producer’s decision
in a dynamic programming framework and recover the parameters in the model with
data on the decisions made for 84 thousand Albertan oil and gas wells from 2000
to 2007. The decision depends on observable and unobservable states of nature,
as well as a producer’s perception of what the future state of nature will be. One
such state is the recoverable reserves that a well taps into, for which I exploit a
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previously unused dataset of the official reserve estimates of 47 thousand oil and
gas pools in Alberta from 2000 to 2007. As this dataset comes from a panel I am
able to estimate the change in recoverable reserves, by technological improvements,
discoveries or reevaluations, depending on the price of oil or gas. The model predicts
that with a high natural gas price there is potential for large increases in the quantity
of recoverable reserves, however in the case of oil, a high price does not significantly
increase recoverable reserves.
After recovering the model primitives the model predicts that very little of
the oil and gas supply is forfeited under policies that induce decommissioning. The
model also predicts that only with a significant increase in prices or the efficiency
of recovery is there a notable decrease in the percentage of inactive wells, and that
the additional contribution to the oil and gas supply from these reactivated wells is
only marginal. This implies that typically wells are left inactive not because of the
option to reactivate, but rather because the cost of environmental cleanup is too
high.
1.1 Literature Review
In this dissertation, I estimate the structural parameters of a real options
model, and am thereby able to test the goodness-of-fit of a real options model to
actual firm behavior. Real options extends the Black and Scholes [1973] and Merton
[1973] theory for financial options to that of irreversible real investments. Real
option models put value on investment flexibility; having the option to wait before
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investing will add value to the project. Much of the literature on real options relies
on examples from the natural resource industry so that models of many different
discrete decisions in the industry have been developed. The same three choices
presented in this paper (to activate, inactivate or decommission a project) have
already been modeled by Brennan and Schwartz [1985]2, Dixit and Pindyck [1994],
Gamba and Tesser [2009]. However, none of these authors applied their models to
real data.
Unlike the case of financial derivative models, empirical investigations to test
the fit of real option models to data are rare. Gamba and Tesser [2009] note that
this is due to two factors: the value of the state variables is often not observed;
and because of the existence of non-price or quantity uncertainty. The empirical
examination of real options has been limited to comparing stylized facts from the
predictions of real options models to the data. Many of these papers have relied
on having data for the cost parameters rather than estimating these parameters
structurally, restricting their investigations to small sample sizes. Moel and Tufano
[2002] compare stylized facts from real options theory to estimates from a probit
analysis of 285 gold mines, but without data on opening and closing costs. Paddock
et al. [1988] apply real options to value offshore petroleum leases using data on 21
offshore petroleum tracts. Slade [2001] determines the value of mine opening and
closings using panel data for 21 mines. The opening, closing and maintenance costs
were “rough” estimates obtained from interviewing people in the industry. With
2There have also been many extensions to Brennan and Schwartz [1985]’s numerical example of
opening, closing and decommissioning a hypothetical copper mine (for example, Castillo-Ramirez
[1999], Cortazar and Casassus [1998],Cortazar et al. [2001] and Stensland and Tjostheim [1989]).
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60 observations from copper mines Harchaoui and Lasserre [2001] test if there are
trigger prices as predicted by theory. Hurn and Wright [1994] use data on 108
oil wells to estimate a hazard model to examine the time to develop a field to test
predictions for irreversible investment decisions. While the literature on real options
in the natural resources industry is large, to the best of my knowledge, this is the
first time that there has been a structural estimation of the primitives of this type
of model with real data.
Generally data on production are more readily available than data on costs
(production reporting is usually mandatory, whereas cost data are proprietary) and
therefore the gains of not relying on cost data are immense. For this paper, relative
costs are estimated using the data on production decisions via Rust [1987]’s Nested
Fixed Point Algorithm allowing for a powerful way to take advantage of the extensive
production datasets available. This technique will not identify all costs, but only
relative costs3. Aided by this technique to estimate the costs, this is the first time
that a dataset so large has been combined with a real options model.
Furthermore, throughout the real options literature the permanent closure op-
tion is often downplayed. Decommissioning costs are treated as negligible or null
[Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, Dixit and Pindyck, 1994], or the option of decommis-
sioning is completely left out of the choice set [Moel and Tufano, 2002, Slade, 2001,
Mason, 2001, Paddock et al., 1988]. By assuming away decommissioning costs, the
previous literature has overlooked the case of firms that continue to maintain the
3To identify the absolute costs external information of actual well sale prices would be needed.
For the time being I refrain from interpreting parameter values.
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option to reactivate a project, even when they have no intention to reactivate.
If the costs from mothballing a project are small enough relative to the decom-
missioning costs, this behavior would be privately optimal. This is especially the
case in the natural resources industry where the large imprint that is typically left
on the environment make decommissioning costs high. Should there be externalities
from mothballing a project (such as continued contamination of groundwater) that
are not accounted for in the decision, then this behavior may not be socially optimal.
If a firm “temporarily” closes a hazardous site, when in fact there is no potential or
intention to reactivate, regulators have reason to implement policies to ensure that
environmental obligations are met.
In future work I will use the model developed here to investigate financial
bonding mechanisms to ensure environmental remediation. One of the main reasons
for a policy to induce prompt environmental cleanup is the risk that the firm will
declare bankruptcy. The concern that oil and gas companies may walk away from
their environmental obligations has been brought up by Boyd [2001], Parente et al.
[2006], Ferreira et al. [2003]. While these authors discuss bonding mechanisms, the
model here can be used to quantify the effect of a bond on production as well as the
choice to undertake cleanup.
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2 Background
Oil and gas activity in the Western Canada Sedimentary Basin began at the
turn of the last century and thus the conventional oil and gas reserves are mature
and the vast number of oil and gas wells present is not indicative of the remaining
reserves that they tap into. Alberta’s conventional oil production (that which is
pumped out of the ground from a well) contributed 0.52 million barrels a day [ERCB,
2008], or .6% of the world’s oil supply in 2007 [EIA2009, 2009]. Alberta’s natural
gas production contributed .135 trillion m3 [ERCB, 2008], or 4.6% of the world’s gas
supply in 2006 [EIA2008]. The reserves of conventional oil, estimated at 1.5 billion
barrels in 2007, is eclipsed by the estimated reserves of non-conventional oil from
the oil sands, estimated at 173 billion barrels [ERCB, 2008].
Producers leaving a well inactive commonly claim that they are waiting for the
price to increase to a point at which the well will become profitable. While a well
might be drilled in a pool with a high estimated amount of oil in place, the current
recovery factor, or fraction of the oil in place that can be recovered is likely to be
low. Therefore, a producer might want to hold on to a well that taps into a massive
reserve, even if it is not currently profitable to produce oil or gas, in the hopes that
prices or technology improve. However many of the inactive wells are in a state
of hysteresis because the cost to either retrofit the well for production or finally
decommission the well is high. The preceding reasons for leaving wells inactive
are directly modeled in this paper. The following are some reasons for inactivity
that are not explicitly entered into the model (but only enter via an error term
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that compensates for unobservable states): (1) technical difficulties (for example,
blockage in the wellbore, a leak caused by corrosion or erosion, an external fire, or
a temperature change causing mechanical failure), (2) pipeline failure or pipeline
capacity reached, (3) gas plant capacity reached or (4) a mandated suspension for
exceeding the maximum rate limit4 assigned to the well by the regulator.
The development of enhanced recovery methods has brought wells back into
production after many years of inactivity. These extraction methods have improved
over the last century, with the introduction of horizontal wells, progressive cavity
pumps, cyclic steam stimulation, and coiled tubing [Beliveau and Baker, 2003].
Today most operators use enhanced recovery methods, most commonly by injecting
water or gas into the well or a nearby well. There are many other techniques to
increase the production rate, such as generating carbon dioxide in-situ, dissolving
minerals with acid, injecting hot fluid or steam, or creating in-situ combustion.
There are also various pumps that provide mechanical energy such as sucker rod
pumping, electrical submersible pumping, hydraulic piston pumping, hydraulic jet
pumping, progressive cavity pumping, and plunger lift systems.
With the introduction of these methods, recoverable reserves have been seen
to increase, rather than decrease with time. For example from 1978 to 1993 the
decrease in U.S. natural gas reserves by production was approximately the same
as the increase in reserves, where 87% of the increase came from existing fields
[Beliveau and Baker, 2003]. And within the last ten years, the development of hy-
4Various wells must conform to maximum rate limitations set by the industry regulator. These
limits are to ensure that the cumulative amount of oil or gas extracted is maximized. In our model
we will not truncate by maximum rate limit because only about 10 percent of the wells have limits
placed on them, and for only a portion of those wells is the rate limit binding.
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draulic fracturing5 and horizontal drilling has made natural gas from shale accessible
and thereby dramatically increased the recoverable reserves of natural gas. Reserve
growth was first examined by Arrington [1960] using his own company’s reservoir
data. And since then reserve growth has been studied using state or state subdivi-
sion estimates of initial established reserves from the American Petroleum Institute
[Morehouse, 1997], or a small number of pools [Verma and Henry, 2004]. This is
the first time that such a large dataset on reserves has been used to study reserve
growth.
2.1 Environmental Impacts
The fact that recoverable reserves can increase over time, gives credence to the
claim that wells should not be decommissioned immediately. On the other hand,
without proper decommissioning (and in some cases, even after proper decommis-
sioning) a well poses a risk to vegetation, soil, surface water, and underground
aquifers. Many wellbores extend thousands of meters underground, and it is often
only a steel casing or cement that isolates the different formations. The casing might
rust out or crack (especially when there is much sand or saltwater lifted along with
the hydrocarbons) and contaminants such as uranium, lead, salt, iron, selenium,
sulfates, and radon [Kubichek et al., 1997] may enter into formations that contain
freshwater. The likelihood of this occurring increases when injection from disposal
or enhanced recovery builds pressure [Canter et al., 1987].
5Hydraulic fracturing is the injection of fluids (many of which are hazardous and carcinogenic6)
at high pressure to fracture the formation, releasing the gas.
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The most prevalent contaminant from oil and gas wells into freshwater aquifers
has been methane gas7. Methane is the second largest contributor to radiative forc-
ing from anthropogenic greenhouse gases (second to carbon dioxide) [Reilly et al.,
2006]. The second largest source of methane emissions is from the energy industry,
where the majority of those methane emissions can be attributed to the production
and processing of natural gas and oil, including due to the fugitive release from leak-
ing gas wells [EPA, Katzenstein et al., 2003]. Another concern surrounding methane
migration is that high concentrations can lead to explosions (there are instances of
homes and windmills exploding). The presence of methane also foreshadows worse
events to come. Methane indicates that a leak exists, meaning that other contam-
inants that are in lower concentrations, and slower moving than methane, follow
shortly behind. Those more hazardous contaminants are the carcinogens uranium
and radon, the probable carcinogen selenium, and the neurotoxin lead. Decommis-
sioning a well does not guarantee that there will be no leaks, and often improperly
decommissioned wells cause problems, however nonetheless, the risk is reduced as
compared to when the well is active or inactive.
2.2 Various Regulations in the United States
In the U.S., minimum standards and regulations for well decommissioning
(plugging, abandoning and reclamation) vary within and across states, depending
on the regulatory authority and characteristics of the well. For example, the Bureau
7It is possible that methane may enter groundwater through shallow reservoirs that a water
well penetrates, swamps or landfills, which has averted liability away from oil and gas producers.
To determine the source of the methane gas isotopes are used.
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of Land Management oversees the abandonment of wells drilled on Federal Land, a
state’s Department of Environmental Quality, Department of Conservation, or Oil
and Gas Commission oversees oil and gas wells, and the Environmental Protection
Agency oversees underground injection wells. Most require that cement plugs be
placed across any open hydrocarbon-bearing formations, freshwater aquifers, and
perhaps several other areas near the surface, including the top of the wellbore.
However, stringency in granting permits for temporary inactivity, standards for
materials used, and bonding requirements for abandonment vary by jurisdiction.
Many states require that wells that have not produced (for 30 days to a year,
depending on the state) must be plugged and abandoned unless permission is granted
to leave the well in “Temporary Abandonment” (TA) status. It is hard for the
regulator to get a handle on the legitimacy of the request, and TA status is granted
easily. Furthermore, the fine for leaving a well inactive, without permission, is
usually small, for example in Kansas, the fine is only $1008. In Indiana it was found
that many of the “active” were sitting idle with essential operating units removed9.
In California, an operator does not need permission to leave a well inactive, but
must do one of the following: pay an annual fee based on the length of time a well has
been idle ($100 for 5 years, $250 for 10 years, or $500 for 15 years or more), establish
an escrow account of $5,000 for each idle well, funded at the rate of $500 per year,
file a bond of $5,000 per idle well, or file an Idle-Well Management/Elimination Plan
to commit to plugging or returning the well to production10. However, in California,
8http://www.kcc.state.ks.us/conservation/cons rr 0704.pdf
9http://www.in.gov/dnr/dnroil/pdf/inactivewells.pdf
10State of California, Department of Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Re-
sources: http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/idle well/Pages/idle well.aspx)
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there is also the option to file a blanket bond of 1 million dollars that will cover
all wells (including idle wells). In New Mexico11 and Montana12, that blanket bond
is only $50,000. And the Bureau of Land Management requires a blanket bond
of at least $25,000 to cover all wells drilled in a State, or $150,000 to cover all
wells nationwide13. In Michigan, there are blanket bonds of up to 100 wells, but
also, abandoning without properly plugging a well is a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment14.
2.3 Regulations in Alberta
2.3.1 Regulations for Decommissioning
In Alberta, it is required that all wells eventually be decommissioned however
it is left up to the firm to decide when to decommission15. Decommissioning a well
entails abandonment and reclamation. To abandon a well is to leave downhole or
subsurface structures in a permanently safe and stable condition so that it can be
left indefinitely without damaging the environment. It is required that all non-saline
water formations are shut-off with cement. All porous zones must be isolated with
cement plugs to prevent any crossflow. The cement between the casing and the
11New Mexico Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources Department, Oil Conservation Division:
http://www.emnrd.state.nm.us/ocd/documents/formcbbsample.pdf
12Montana Code Annotated, Title 82, Chapter 11:
http://leg.mt.gov/content/lepo/2005 2006/subcommittees/hb790/minutes/eqchb79003162006 ex01.pdf
13Code of Federal Regulations (CFR Oil & Gas Bonding). 43 CFR 3104.1-3104.8 (2007)
14Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Oil and Gas Regulations:
http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-ogs-land-fuelsmineral-oilandgas-regs.pdf
15The Energy Resources Conservation Board does have the authority to order that a wellsite
be decommissioned, however this is not a common occurrence and the order is often rescinded
or amended. For example, in 2007 there were only 6 well abandonment orders and in 2006 there
were 19 well abandonment orders, but as of June 2009 only 2 of these wells have been aban-
doned.[AbndOrder, 2009]
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formation must be checked to ensure that there are no flows of water or gas between
formations. The operator must cap the well and test that there is no buildup of gas
below the cap. Any detected leaks must be reported and repaired [ERCB020, 2007].
Reclamation includes the removal of any structures, decontamination of land or
water, and “stabilization, contouring, maintenance, conditioning or reconstruction
of the surface of the land” [EPEA, 2000]. Abandonment is under the jurisdiction
of the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), and reclamation is
under the jurisdiction of Alberta Environment. The duty to abandon inactive wells
is put forth in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act [OGCA, 2000], and reclamation
in the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act [EPEA, 2000].
It can be very inexpensive to sustain an idle well–often only costing the com-
pensation to the surface rights owners. As the province owns most of the minerals
in Alberta, they auction off the rights by parcels of land without giving notice to
the surface owners or occupiers. The holder of the mineral rights will then have the
right to enter and use the surface of the land. Outlined in the Surface Rights Act
[SRA, 2000], the operator can either reach an agreement with the surface owner pri-
vately or can go to the Surface Rights Board to receive a right of entry order and to
determine the compensation necessary. The annual payment for a wellsite is based
on “loss of use” and “adverse effects” only (not land value or entry fee which is paid
one time in the first year). The compensation must be paid until the operator has
received a reclamation certificate. Of 4069 well leases, the average loss of land use
payment was $184/acre and $1146 for general disturbance [Marriott, 2001].
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2.3.2 Consistency of Regulations over the Sample Period
The estimation in this paper relies on the assumption that the regulatory
regime was constant during the sample period. Fortunately the royalty regime has
remained the same from 1993 until 2009 [MineralAct], coinciding with the study
period. The royalty structure in Alberta adjusts according to price, when the pool
was discovered, and productivity, all accounted for in the estimation. There were,
however, two regulations that increased the cost of leaving a well inactive issued
during the study period. In 2004 the ERCB increased requirements for inactive
wells [ERCB013, 2007], whereby low risk wells (or those wells that have non critical
levels of sour gas (H2S < 5%), and gas wells with an open flow potential of less than
28 thousand m3/day) are to be inspected every 1 to 5 years. Medium and high risk
wells (non-flowing oil wells with sour gas) must either place a packer and a tubing
plug, or a bridge plug in the wellbore and high risk wells with a critical level of sour
gas, must cap the bridge plug with 8 meters of cement.
The second regulation that increased the cost of inactivity was a bonding
scheme introduced in 2002. Firms with liabilities that exceed their assets must post a
bond for the difference. The liability is calculated as the sum of the decommissioning
costs of the firm’s inactive wells and 75% of the decommissioning costs of their active
wells. The decommissioning costs used in the calculation for the bond are voluntarily
reported amounts paid. The firms that want to ensure that the bond remains low
would report instances of low decommissioning expenditures, and the firms that
fear other firms are accumulating liability recklessly would report instances of high
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decommissioning expenditures. The former appears to abandonment costs used in
the calculation range from $7,200 to $90,000 and land reclamation costs vary by
location from $13,200 (grasslands area east) to $33,700 (alpine area). However,
abandonment and reclamation costs often dramatically surpass these figures. For
example, the Orphan Well Association spent over $2 million to re-enter and repair
one orphan well [Orphan]. Not all firms post a bond because it is only posted when
the firm’s liability exceeds their assets, where assets are calculated using the firms
reported production of oil and gas from the preceding year. If the bond is less than
the cost to decommission, there is not sufficient incentive to decommission. If a
company becomes defunct, the Orphan Well Association will collect the required
abandonment and reclamation costs from the remaining firms in the industry based
on each firms share of industry liability. This levy is roughly $280 per inactive well,
and can be assumed not to influence the decision to leave a well inactive.
I model the well as if the well were a stand-alone entity, and I do not consider
the portfolio of wells that the firm has a working interest in when determining the
optimal operating state. The number of wells on a mineral lease might especially
influence the decision to decommission. Once all of the wells on a mineral lease are
decommissioned, the mineral rights are reverted to the Crown, and therefore if there
is only one non-decommissioned well on the lease there is likely a lower probability
to decommission. Fortunately, most of the leases are for one quarter section, or 160
acres, and only one oil well can be drilled on one quarter section (and for gas wells,
only one gas well can be drilled per section, so a firm must obtain the mineral leases
for all four quarters of the same section in order to drill a gas well).
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3 Data
The data collected on the oil and gas industry in Alberta is unrivaled by data
collected in other oil producing areas in its comprehensiveness and accessibility.
Here, five datasets of the Albertan oil and gas industry are used. The first dataset
is a panel of production from the universe of oil and gas wells in Alberta. Obtained
through IHS Incorporated (that distribute the records collected by the Alberta En-
ergy Resources Conservation Board (ERCB)), this dataset contains monthly oil and
gas production dating back to 1924, with complete records starting after 1961. There
is information on the location (latitude and longitude as well as the name of the field
and pool that the well is on), depth, licence date, spud date (when the drill hit the
ground), on production date, name of the current operator and name of the original
operator (unfortunately there is no information on whether the well switched hands
between the original and current operators).
The second dataset is a panel of official reserve estimates of all nonconfidential
pools16 in Alberta from both the ERCB and the National Energy Board of Canada.
The dataset was obtained from the ERCB and spans 2000 to 2007 and contains
67,142 oil and gas pools although not observed in every year. The year that the
estimate was last reviewed is listed and therefore the data can be extended to years
prior to 2000 if the last review date of the pool was before 2000. This dataset con-
tains: (1) initial oil or gas in place, which is the estimated volume of oil or gas in
place before any extraction, and can be updated every year17, (2) recovery factor,
16All pools eventually lose their confidential status (usually after 1 year), and so this dataset
contains nearly all pools in Alberta.
17“Initial” is a misleading term because it refers to the estimate before extraction and can be
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which is the fraction of the oil or gas in place that can be extracted “under current
technology and present and anticipated economic conditions”[ERCB, 2008], (3) ini-
tial established reserves, which is equal to the initial oil or gas in place multiplied
by the recovery factor, and (4) remaining established reserves, which is the initial
established reserves minus the cumulative production and surface loss. Each pool
contains information on characteristics of the pools and hydrocarbons in those pools
such as porosity, initial pressure, area, density, temperature, and water saturation
amongst others.
The third dataset is a list of all wells that were permanently decommissioned.
To decommission a well entails that the well has met abandonment standards set
by the ERCB [ERCB020, 2007], reclamation standards set by Alberta Environment
[ABEnvironment, 1995] and received a reclamation certificate from Alberta En-
vironment or Alberta Sustainable Resource Development, or were exempted from
certification. The dataset contains wells that were abandoned along with the date
of abandonment, and the wells that received a reclamation certificate or were recla-
mation exempt.
The fourth dataset consists of GIS shape files that designate areas that accord-
ing to the Petroleum Services Association of Canada (PSAC) have similar costs in
production and drilling. The PSAC areas were entered into ArcView GIS to assign
a PSAC area to each well to account for heterogeneity in costs across Alberta. The
seven areas are depicted in Figure 1 and described in Table 1.
The final dataset is the average wellhead price of crude oil and natural gas
updated every year–it does not refer to the operator’s initial guess of reserve size.
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Table 1: Characteristics of PSAC Areas
PSAC
Area Surface Hydrocarbon Characteristics
1 Rocky Mountains Deep gas Strict environmental regulations
2 Ranching, farming and forest Oil and gas Easily accessed
3 Agricultural prairie grassland Gas and medium/heavy oil Easily accessed
4 Prairie and woodland Gas and heavy oil Easily accessed
5 Agricultural Oil and gas Most densely populated area
6 Prairie and woodland Shallow gas Only winter drilling
7 Agricultural and logging Oil and gas Often no road access
Figure 1: PSAC Areas
in Alberta, obtained from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers’ Sta-
tistical Handbook [CAPP, 2009]. The wellhead price is inflated to 2007 dollars
using Statistics Canada’s quarterly machinery and equipment price index for min-
ing, quarries and oil wells. The wellhead price paths for crude oil and natural gas
prices are illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Annual Crude Oil and Natural Gas Wellhead Prices in Alberta
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3.1 Description of the subsample
The full dataset of the universe of wells in Alberta is pared down into a subsam-
ple that is used for the estimation. Excluding coalbed methane, heavy oil, injection
and water wells there are 350,457 wells in the production dataset. As the model here
depends on the well’s remaining reserves, the full sample is restricted to only those
wells that have a reserve estimate. Of the 350,457 wells, 105,207 are in a pool that is
listed in the reserves dataset, and these are used in the subsample. The subsample
is further reduced by deleting wells that traverse both oil and gas pools. Doing so
does not significantly reduce the size of the subsample, but does significantly reduce
the computational complexity because modeling the choice to producing oil or gas
is avoided without losing much insight into the decision of operating state. After
deleting all wells that produce oil and gas from different pools, the final subsample
contains 94,009 wells distinguished as either oil wells or gas wells.
A panel is created where each well is classified as either active, inactive, or
decommissioned for each year starting with the year the well was drilled until 2007.
A well is classified as active if it produced any amount of gas or oil within that year,
classified as inactive if it did not produce oil or gas in twelve months or more, and
classified as decommissioned if it appeared in the dataset of decommissioned wells.
A snapshot of all oil and gas wells in different operating states in 2007 is shown in
Figure 3.
The distribution of different operating states according to age groups for the








Figure 3: Oil and Gas wells in Alberta in 2007
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There is a higher proportion of wells that are active in the subsample than in the
full sample. The subsample does not contain as large a proportion of young wells
that have been decommissioned as the full sample. This is because more than 45%
of the wells that are decommissioned in Alberta are decommissioned immediately
after being drilled (Figure 5(a)). Upon drilling the well, if the operator realizes that
the well will not be productive, then it is worthwhile to decommission immediately
because the necessary equipment is present, and it can be decommissioned before
investing in the completion of the well for production. The wells that do not tap into
an oil or gas pool are more likely to be immediately decommissioned, and they will
also not show up in the subsample (that contains only wells with pool information).
Therefore this paper examines the decision of decommissioning wells that are or once
were deemed producible. The distribution of the age that wells are decommissioned
in the full sample when omitting any well that had zero production hours (Figure
5(b)) is very similar to the distribution of the age that wells are decommissioned in
the subsample (Figure 5(c)). The decision of whether to complete the well or not is
a separate decision from whether to produce from an already completed well or not.
And indeed it is more challenging to determine the future of wells that have or once
had a potential for production as opposed to those for which there is no question
that they cannot produce.
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Table 2: Distribution of wells according to status within age groups
Number of Proportion Proportion Proportion
Age (in years) Observations Active Inactive Decommissioned
(Subsample) (Full) (Subsample) (Full) (Subsample) (Full) (Subsample) (Full)
age = 0 0 130791 N/A 0.476 N/A 0.427 N/A 0.097
1 ≤ age < 10 162162 823205 0.719 0.566 0.249 0.269 0.032 0.164
10 ≤ age < 20 105269 445136 0.532 0.356 0.339 0.241 0.128 0.403
20 ≤ age < 30 64462 436830 0.504 0.369 0.298 0.200 0.198 0.430
30 ≤ age < 40 23848 192081 0.469 0.260 0.298 0.213 0.233 0.527
40 ≤ age < 50 18391 150170 0.395 0.220 0.287 0.341 0.319 0.438
50 ≤ age < 60 9095 124015 0.223 0.093 0.238 0.539 0.539 0.368
60 ≤ age < 70 1717 7541 0.378 0.120 0.378 0.457 0.244 0.423
age ≥ 70 973 5365 0.337 0.132 0.217 0.470 0.446 0.398
Notes: Data from 2000-2007. The full sample comprises all wells in Alberta. The subsample


















































Figure 4: Proportion of Operating State by Age
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Table 3: Distribution of operating choice for inactive wells by age groups
Number of Proportion Proportion Proportion
Age (in years) Observations Reactivated Stay Inactive Decommissioned
(Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas) (Oil) (Gas)
1 ≤ age < 10 18963 21091 0.110 0.194 0.874 0.790 0.016 0.015
10 ≤ age < 20 19892 14965 0.056 0.066 0.922 0.915 0.022 0.019
20 ≤ age < 30 7997 11234 0.057 0.075 0.914 0.897 0.029 0.028
30 ≤ age < 40 2340 4791 0.046 0.054 0.928 0.913 0.026 0.033
40 ≤ age < 50 2176 3135 0.030 0.042 0.945 0.929 0.025 0.030
50 ≤ age < 60 704 1461 0.024 0.027 0.953 0.955 0.023 0.018
60 ≤ age < 70 131 503 0 0.010 1 0.990 0 0
age ≥ 70 50 157 0 0 1 0.987 0 0.013
Notes: Data from 2000-2007 subsample.
Table 3 shows the proportion of inactive oil and gas wells that have been
reactivated, left inactive, or decommissioned by different age intervals. To determine
whether the well is an “oil” or a “gas” well I depend on whether the well is drilled
in an oil pool or a gas pool, these proportions are of wells in the subsample. As
expected the proportion of inactive wells that get reactivated decreases with the
age of the well. The proportion of inactive wells that are decommissioned is low for
very young wells and for very old wells. An explanation could be that very young
wells are more likely to be reactivated and hence decommissioning is lower, and very
old wells are more costly to decommission and so they are not decommissioned as
readily (but there are far fewer observations of inactive wells older than 50 years to
make this inference). The table reiterates that the hysteresis of inactivity increases
as wells age.
The majority of the wells have small reserves and only a few have large reserves,
some being extremely large–for example, the largest gas reserve is 1,500 times larger
than the mean gas reserve (Table 4). The pools with large reserves have more than
one well–as many as 4151 wells in a gas pool, and 711 in an oil pool. In the estimation
25
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Figure 5: Histogram of Age when Decommissioned
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per well reserves, Q = Q/n are used as a state variable18. Depth, porosity, density,
initial pressure, temperature, water saturation and the year the pool was discovered
are all constant over time and are used in grouping the wells into types. Temperature
and water saturation in reality would not be time invariant, but it is still valuable
to use these in forming groups of similar types of wells. The summary statistics also
show the number of different firms that are in the same pool. In the majority of the
pools only one firm has access to the pool. In future research it will be interesting
to model the interaction between different firms on the same pool19. In this paper,
wells that are in single-well pools are put into different groups from wells in multi-
well pools. The average number of wells in a gas pool is 3.5 (and 4.4 for oil pools),
but the majority of the time there is only 1 well per pool (the median and mode are
1 for both oil and gas).
18Livernois [1987] also incorporates the concept of reserves per well.
19There has been extensive theoretical research on this issue, but the empirical remains scarce
(see Libecap [2003] for an overview of the literature.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Unit
Qg 118187 15.233 62.948 0 8800 E6m3
Qo 54523 27.087 237.073 0 43871.42872 E3Barrels
Wellhead Priceg 37 111.901 64.761 25.892 293.905 2007C$ /E3m3
Wellhead Priceo 37 30.160 12.116 12.881 64.448 2007C$ /Barrel
Ageg 61876 19.861 15.757 1 104 Years
Ageo 31430 16.581 12.145 1 94 Years
Qg 118187 32.973 297.793 0 51271 E6m3
Qo 54523 135.644 1026.834 0 104866.4698 E3Barrels
No. of wells in Poolg 118187 3.589 47.018 1 4117 Wells
No. of wells in Poolo 54523 4.442 17.905 1 699 Wells
No. of firms in Pool 169841 1.279 1.317 1 91 Firms
qg (Full) 1241677 1.777 7.947 0.0001 930.388 E6m3
qg (Subsample) 322907 1.679 8.266 0.0001 568.394 E6m3
qo (Full) 505749 9.746 20.366 .001 1389.129 E3Barrels
qo (Subsample) 155773 7.267 14.507 .001 822.946 E3Barrels
Depth 93239 1197.528 690.357 90.9 6552 m
Porosityg 22452 .200 .075 0.01 0.4 Fraction
Porosityo 25894 .161 .074 0.01 0.36 Fraction
Densityg 22452 .643 .076 0.54 2.03 Fraction
Densityo 25894 868.644 48.012 708 999 kg/m3
Initial Pressureg 22452 9038.083 7564.568 130 99625 kPa
Initial Pressureo 25894 12568.804 5688.370 1442 61097 kPa
Temperatureo 25894 50.144 20.342 9 350 C ◦
Water Saturationo 25894 .314 .115 0.06 0.82 Fraction
Wells per Firm (Sub) 1196 281.927 2015.260 1 44095 Wells
Wells per Firm (Full) 2818 124.364 1319.684 1 44095 Wells
Pool Discovery Yearg 22452 1989.667 13.898 1904 2007 Year
Pool Discovery Yearo 25894 1988.305 12.401 1910 2006 Year
Duration Inactiveo 9556 8.39 8.33 0 73 Years
Duration Inactiveg 12298 9.58 10.23 0 78 Years
Duration Activeo 14472 10.11 9.11 0 46 Years
Duration Activeg 34047 11.35 11.85 0 46 Years
Notes: The full sample encompasses all oil (o) and gas (g) wells in Alberta and the subsample
encompasses only wells that have pool information. Data on remaining reserves (Q) is listed for
pools 1993-2007. Extraction (q) is listed for wells, 1993-2007. The pool specific variables, depth,
porosity, density, initial pressure, temperature, water saturation, area of pool and discovery year
are time invariant in the data. Data on the number of wells held by a firm, age of the wells, and
duration active and inactive is a snapshot of 2007. Price data are the wellhead price from
1971-2007. E3=1000.
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In a reduced-form multinomial logit regression for the discrete choice to acti-
vate, inactivate or abandon, as expected, the older the well the more likely it is to be
abandoned, and the more likely it is to be inactive than active (Table 5). Also, when
there are large remaining reserves, the wells are less likely to be abandoned, and
more likely to be active than inactive. Also as expected, with higher prices wells are
less likely to be abandoned, and gas wells are more likely active than inactive, but
not as expected, oil wells are slightly more likely to be inactive than active. There
could be some unobserved variable that is correlated with price and propensity to
be inactive. Pool and well characteristics such as porosity, initial pressure, depth
and density are included to determine which time invariants to cluster the data on.
Gas wells are clustered on depth, initial pressure and density. Deeper gas wells
with higher initial pressure and density are less likely to be decommissioned (Table
5). The wells are not clustered on porosity because the sign in the reduced-form
multinomial logit regression (Table 5) for gas wells and the regressions of quantity
extracted (Table 6) are not as expected. More porous rock is easier and cheaper
to extract from, but higher porosity makes gas wells less likely to be active than
inactive or decommissioned. This could also be a result of more wells being drilled in
more porous rock, and more wells results in less extraction. The questionable result
that wells with higher porosity extract less oil and gas makes porosity an unreliable
variable to cluster the data on.
The wells are divided into groups of well type, g, depending on, (1) whether the
well is an oil or gas well, (2) whether the well is in a single-well pool or a multi-well
pool, (3) the royalty regime applicable, (4) PSAC area, and within these groups, (4)
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Table 5: Mulitnomial Logit Estimates
Oil Wells Gas Wells
Activate vs. Inactivate vs. Activate vs. Inactivate vs.
Decommission Decommission Decommission Decommission
Intercept 1.2027 ** -0.4852 ** Intercept 0.9294 ** -0.8543 **
(0.2151) (0.2209) (0.1158) (0.1210)
Qo 0.1831 ** 0.1712 ** Qg 0.0156 ** 0.0151 **
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Priceo 0.0030 ** 0.0071 ** Priceg 3.126E-06 ** 1.237E-06 **
(0.0005) (0.0005) (1.507E-07) (1.587E-07)
Ageo -0.0677 ** -0.0432 ** Ageg -0.0802 ** -0.0495 **
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Porosityo 1.8737 ** 1.4764 ** Porosityg -1.4537 ** 1.6757 **
(0.1658) (0.1696) (0.1485) (0.1587)
Initial Pressureo 2.994E-05** 2.865E-06 Initial Pressureg 8.782E-06 ** 1.102E-05 **
(2.853E-06) (2.920E-06) (2.844E-06) (2.956E-06)
Deptho -0.0002** -1.779E-05 Depthg 0.0003 ** 0.0003 **
(3.331E-05) (3.297E-05) (2.519E-05) (2.633E-05)
Densityo -0.0006 ** 0.0007 ** Densityg 1.2688 ** 2.0219 **
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.1735) (0.1795)
No. Wells in Poolo 0.0022 ** 0.0006 ** No. Wells in Poolg 0.0033 ** 0.0017 **
(6.280E-05) (6.787E-05) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Water Saturationo -0.8337 ** -1.8483 **
(0.0740) (0.0768)
Gas to Oil Ratio 0.0063 ** 0.0034 **
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Temperatureo 0.0049 ** 0.0113 **
(0.0009) (0.0009)
Log Likelihood -164358 -161065
No. of Observations 171834 183757
R2 0.1423 0.1484
To decommission is the reference choice in the logit. ∗∗ parameter estimates are significantly
different from zero at the 2.5% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
two clusters based on time invariants (for gas: initial pressure, density and depth of
well). The clustering only occurs if the likelihood ratio test confirms that clustering
improves the fit. This results in 88 types of wells. The royalty regime depends
on when the pool was discovered: “old” for oil from pools discovered before 1974,
“new” for oil from pools discovered between 1974 and 1992, and “third tier” for oil
from pools discovered after 1992. The royalty for gas refers to: “old” for gas from
pools discovered after 1974 and “new” for gas from pools discovered after 1974.
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The reserve and production datasets can be credited for being comprehensive
but perhaps not for being accurate. The estimation assumes that the data on
estimated reserves are the same as the well operator’s estimated reserves. The
reserve estimates however are made by the ERCB using data on production decline
combined with the volumetric estimate of the reserves in place. Estimation based
on material balance methods is often omitted because of unreliable pressure, volume
and temperature data[ERCB, 2008]. The operator no doubt has a better estimate
of recoverable reserves.
The production dataset contains firm reported volumes to which the accuracy
is difficult to attest. The ERCB identifies cases when there is any difference in the
reported production of oil from a production company and a pipeline company. In
the case of natural gas, the ERCB identifies differences in reported production of
20% or more for volumes greater than 15,000 m3 . When the difference is 5% to
20% of reported gas volumes the penalty is only a warning message. Non-compliance
results in a fee of $100 if a well does not report in a given month, and upon persis-
tent noncompliance the firm might be subject to increased audits or inspections, or
partial or full suspension [ERCB019, 2007]. Nonetheless, to the best of my knowl-
edge this is the largest dataset of a natural resource industry to be applied in the
literature on real options. And it is with these data that the composition of active,
inactive and decommissioned wells can be replicated to match reality closely.
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4 Model
Dynamic programming lends itself to the modeling of the optimal operating
state of an oil or gas well–it is a dynamic decision made under much uncertainty.
The choice of an operating state depends on the expected future stream of profits
from that choice which depends on uncertain prices, technology and reserves. The
producer’s problem is modeled as an infinite time Markov Decision Process, which
as explained in [Rust, 1994], includes a decision variable, d, that is here to extract,
1; temporarily stop extraction, 2; or to permanently decommission and remediate
environmental damages, 3. It is assumed that the producer is rational, and follows a
decision rule dt = δt(st)
∞
t=0 that dictates the optimal choice under all possible states
of nature, st. The decision rule maximizes the expected discounted sum of profits,
V (s) = maxδ Eδ [
∑∞
t=0 β
tπ(st, dt|s0 = s)], where Vt(st) is the value function for the
well when choosing the optimal choice, β is the discount factor, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, and π(·)
is the instantaneous profit from the well. The vector of state variables, s, include the
age of the well, A, the wellhead price of the hydrocarbon, P , the per well remaining
reserves, Q, and the current operating state, o. The current operating state (o=
active, 1, inactive, 2, or decommissioned, 3) is endogenous to the decision, and the
remaining reserves per well is both endogenous (by extraction) and exogenous (upon
technology change or by there being another well in the same pool).
If the producer decides to extract, they will receive the current wellhead price,
P , per quantity extracted, q, less corporate income tax, τ , royalties, R, lifting costs,
C, and a fixed operating cost, M1. Leaving the well inactive also entails an annual
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fixed cost, M2. If the producer decides to permanently decommission the well, they
must pay switching cost SC(1,2→3) and then they do not have to pay the annual fixed
costs, although they will forgo any future extraction.
The firm also pays switching costs when reactivating or inactivating the well.
The producer pays SC(1→2) to temporarily inactivate an active well, SC(2→1) to re-
activate an inactive well and SC(1,2→3), to decommission a well (assumed to be the
same for active and inactive wells). Leaving the well in its current state entails no
switching costs, SC(1→1) = 0, SC(2→2) = 0, and SC(3→3) = 0. To decommission the
well is to enter an absorbing state (in the sample there are only 261 observations of
a switch from decommissioned to active, whereas there were 22,308 observed deac-
tivations, 15,369 reactivations of inactive wells, 1,917 active wells decommissioned,
and 3,664 inactive wells decommissioned).
The profit from a single period is:
π(s, d) =

((1−R)P − C) q −M1 if d=1, active
−τ max{((1−R)P − C) q −M1, 0} − SC(s→1)
−M2 − SC(s→2) if d=2, inactive
−SC(s→3) if d=3, decommission
(1)
The per unit lifting cost C(Q,A, g) is increasing in age, A, and decreasing
in per well reserves, Q20. As costs will also depend on other factors such as well
20Chermak and Patrick [1995] and Foss et al. [2002] show how the lifting cost of natural gas
depends on quantity extracted, and remaining reserves. Chermak and Patrick [1995] use data
from 29 gas wells in Wyoming and Texas from 1988 to 1990, and Foss et al. [2002] use data from
22 gas wells in Alberta for roughly 3 years. They both find that operating costs increase with
quantity extracted, and decrease with remaining reserves. It is expected that extraction costs rise
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depth, porosity, location, etc., the estimation will be repeated for clusters of well
types, g, based on these time invariant states. The royalty rate R(P, q, A) adjusts
according to price, date that the pool was discovered, and quantity produced. τ is
the corporate income tax and is assumed flat for all wells.
The expected present discounted value of the well can be expressed as the
unique solution21 to the Bellman equation:
V (s) = max
d




The Bellman equation contains the conditional expectation of the value func-
tion in the future state, s′. The transition of s to s′ is assumed to be a Markov
process with a transition probability density function h(s′|s, d). Specifically, price
is assumed to follow the exogenous process fP (P
′|P, ς), characterized by parame-
ters ς. Recoverable reserves decrease from extraction but also increase or decrease
from new discoveries, revisions, or technological change. The quantity extracted,
q, is modeled as a random draw from a density, fq(q|Q,A, α), that depends on the
reservoir size, Q, the age of the well, A, and unknown parameters to be estimated,
α. The transition of recoverable reserves from extraction depends on whether the
well is the only well in the pool or not. For wells on single-well pools, the transition
probability of reserves depends on the probability of how much can be extracted,
as reserves are depleted, however, Livernois and Uhler [1987] explain that the discovery of new
reserves can increase the reserves by more than what is extracted, but these new reserves are more
costly to extract. This is how Livernois and Uhler [1987] explain a positive relationship between
extraction costs and reserves using aggregate data from the Albertan oil industry. However, upon
disaggregation, they find the typical results of extraction costs increasing with reserve depletion,
and quantity extracted.
21Following Blackwell’s theorem (outlined in [Rust, 1994] Theorem 2.3)
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fq(Q − Q′|Q,A, α, d), only when the decision, d, is to extract, while for wells on
multi-well pools, reserves transition according to this probability whether the op-
erator extracts or not. Exogenous to the decision, recoverable reserves also follow
another process, fQ(Q
′|Q,P, φ), that accounts for the probability of change from
improved technology, discoveries, reassessment, and additions. Q also decreases
whenever another well is drilled in the pool. A simplification for the time being is
that the probability of a decrease from more wells being drilled is incorporated into
the exogenous change dictated by the transition probability density fQ.
I assume that the producers act as atomistic agents and do not consider gaining
market power when making a choice for the operating state of a well. This is realistic
because the conventional oil and gas wells are owned by over 1,200 different firms
and are mostly on mature fields where the producible quantity, from even from the
most productive wells, is not large enough to have an effect on the price. I also
assume that the well is owned and operated by a single entity, however often many
different firms have working interest in a well (starting from as little as 1% working
interest). Given that operating decisions might need to be negotiated by different
parties, the more firms that have an interest in the well, the slower it might be to
decide on an operating state. Unfortunately, the data do not contain information
on the number of different firms that have working interest in a well, but rather only
a single licensee, and so this assumption is unavoidable, but perhaps not very grave
because most interests are likely aligned.
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4.1 Estimation Strategy: Introduction of Unobservables
The decision rule that maximizes the Bellman equation as specified above
dictates exactly what the producer should do under any given age, price, remaining
reserves and current operating state. However there is no one decision rule with
which the data would perfectly coincide because in reality there are many other
factors that will determine the producer’s decision. Therefore, following Rust [1987]
I add an component, εd, to the profit from each alternative that is observed by the
producer but not by the econometrician. This unobserved component can account
for unobserved heterogeneity in the firms or wells, or more specific characteristics
that influence costs such as pressure, condition of the casing, etc. For example there
are added costs of operating a well when there is excess water that needs disposal, a
blowout, or a worker injured; added costs of leaving a well inactive if the owner of the
surface rights takes the producer to court, or if there is gas is migrating out of the
casing; added costs of proper abandonment if there is the toxic gas hydrogen sulfide
(H2S) present, or if the well traverses potable water. I use Rust’s assumptions on εd
in order to facilitate estimation. First, εd enters the profit in an additively separable
(AS) way so that the expected profit is:
π(s, d) =

((1−R)P − C) Eq −M1 if d=1
−τ max{((1−R)P − C) Eq −M1, 0} − SC(s→1) + ε1
−M2 − SC(s→2) + ε2 if d=2






qfq(y|Q,A, α)dy. Also following Rust [1987, 1988], the transition
probabilities of the state variables can be factored as:
h(s′, ε′|s, ε, d) = f(s′|s, d)ρ(ε′|s′)
where ρ(·) is the transition probability density function of ε, the unobserved state




, P ′, ε′|Q,P, ε, d) = fq(Q−Q′|Q, d)fQ(Q
′|Q)fP (P ′|P )ρ(ε′|Q′, P ′)
This factorization is the Conditional Independence (CI) assumption which implies
that ε′ depends entirely on the observed variables, and not on ε, while the transition
of the observed state variables entirely depends on the current observed states and
not on ε. For example, if a well starts to leak hydrogen sulfide (a highly poisonous
gas), there is the additional cost ε, where the age of the well increases the probability
of a leak, but the leak will not change the age of the well.
Under the additional assumption that ε is independent and identically dis-
tributed with a type I extreme value distribution, the Bellman equation becomes:
Vθ(s, ε) = max
d
[vθ(s, d) + bε(d)]
where vθ is the fixed point of vθ = Γ(vθ), where Γθ is a contraction mapping[Rust,
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1988]:














with scale parameter, b, from the extreme value distribution of ε. Here, I normalize
b to 1 (equivalent to $1 million dollars); if b approaches zero, Vθ(s, ε) converges to
the ordinary Bellman equation. With the CI assumption, computing the fixed point
of Γθ is far easier than without because I would have had to solve for the fixed point,
Vθ, of the Bellman equation:
Vθ(s, ε) = max
d





V (s′)h(s′, ε′|s, ε, d)dε′ds′]
Because of the CI assumption, the expected value is not a function of ε and therefore
I do not have to integrate out the ε distribution to obtain the choice probabilities
for the likelihood function. The assumption of the extreme value distribution allows
for a closed form solution of the choice probabilities–that of the multinomial logit:







Dagsvik [1995] showed that the generalized extreme value class is dense; choice
probabilities from any distribution can be approximated arbitrarily closely by choice
probabilities from the generalized extreme value class. Therefore this framework
can be applied under various settings of correlation between the error terms. It
is possible to estimate a more general discrete choice model than the multinomial
38
logit, by including unobservables with other distributions, using a mixed logit model.
McFadden and Train [2000] show that mixed logits can be used to approximate
any choice probability under mild regularity conditions. Therefore it is possible to
include a distribution for serially correlated unobservables in the mixed logit and
then integrate over this distribution using Monte Carlo methods.
If it is less expensive to access the same reserves by drilling a new well than
reactivating an old well, then the likelihood that a well will be reactivated is lower.
As the model does not include the option to drill a new well, the reduced probability
of reactivation is accounted for by a decrease in the cost of leaving a well inactive
relative to the cost of reactivating. Because the estimates are obtained from data on
decisions that might have been influenced by an option to drill, then incorporated
in any prediction from the model using these estimates is this reduced probability
of reactivation and the model predictions should still conform to reality.








Which can be broken down into a first stage estimation of the parameters in the















p(dit|sit, θ2nd , θ̂1st) (7)
I use the Nested Fixed Point Algorithm22 [Rust, 1987] to estimate the param-
eters, where nested within the algorithm to maximize the likelihood function there
is an inner algorithm to compute the fixed point, vθ, of equation 3. The estimation
is explained in more detail in the following section.
22The same code reformulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, MPEC
[Su, 2008], runs out of memory when using the solver KNITRO called from TOMLAB.
40
5 Estimation
The estimation consists of three stages:
1. First Stage:
This stage consists of estimating the parameters of the operator’s subjective
beliefs for the progression of the state variables over time. This stage is a
standard parametric estimation of the parameters that maximize the first stage
partial likelihood function (equation 6) and does not involve solving the fixed
point. The parameters in this stage are those of the:
• the transition probability density of the price process: ϑr, ςr
• the probability density of the quantity extracted: α0a, α1a, σa
• the transition probability density of remaining reserves: φ0, φ1
2. Second Stage:
In this stage the parameter estimates from the first stage are taken as given
and the remaining parameters of the Bellman equation are estimated by max-
imizing the partial likelihood function that contains the choice probabilities
(equation 7). The parameters estimated in this stage are those of the:
• profit function: C, M1, M2, SC(1→2) and SC(2→1)
The choice probabilities contain the Bellman equation, and therefore each
time that the likelihood iterates over different trial parameter values, the fixed
point to the Bellman equation is solved [Rust, 1987]. The outerloop of the
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algorithm, maximizing the likelihood, was submitted to the solver KNITRO
[Byrd et al.]. The inner loop, that solves the fixed point of equation 3, consists
of successive approximations followed by Newton-Kantorovich iterations Rust
[1988].
3. Third Stage
Third, I obtain consistent standard errors from the full likelihood function
(equation 5). The parameter values from the first stage contain a measurement
error, but they are treated as the true parameters in the second stage, and
so the standard errors are inconsistent. I obtain a consistent estimate of the
covariance matrix by using the consistent parameter values from the first and
second stage as starting points for one Newton step on the full likelihood
function [Rust, 1994].
Well-level heterogeneity is accounted for only to the extent that the dynamic
programming model is estimated separately for each well type, g. All wells of the
same type are treated as homogeneous and a well of the same type that also has the
same reserve size and age is assumed identical. The total number of different types
of wells varies across time periods with the drilling of new wells. It is assumed that
the number of new wells drilled is exogenously specified23.
23For a model of where to drill for oil and gas see Levitt [2009].
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5.1 First Stage Estimates
The first stage involves estimating the operator’s beliefs about future prices
and recoverable reserves. These beliefs are unobservable and subjective, but here I
assume that the operator’s beliefs are recoverable from objective probability mea-
sures estimated from the data (quasi-rational expectations). In estimating the first
stage transition probabilities there is no need to solve for the fixed point of the
Bellman equation. This first stage consists of the estimation for the transition prob-
abilities for price and recoverable reserves. To save computing time the age variable
is discretized into the intervals, A = 1 ≤ age < 5, 5 ≤ age < 15, 15 ≤ age < 30 and
age ≥ 30, under the assumption that wells within these age intervals are similar.
The transition probability of entering the next interval is 1/nyears where nyears is
the number of years in the current interval.
5.1.1 Transition in Remaining Reserves from Extraction
Reserve changes due to extraction are such that when the well is active, the
quantity extracted is modeled as a random draw from a distribution that depends
on the per well remaining reserves, Q. It implies that the operator only chooses
whether to extract and does not have control over the quantity extracted, even
though operators may be controlling the quantity extracted to maximize total re-
covery, or investing in enhanced recovery to increase extraction. I could attempt
to model the quantity extracted as a continuous choice model however I do not
have data on expenditures for enhanced recovery methods and it would not be clear
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how to identify the various technologies used. Therefore here I assume that the ex-
traction is mainly driven by a technologically and geologically determined rate. To
defend this assumption, a regression of the quantity extracted shows that variables
that the operator has no control over (such as depth, density and initial pressure)
are very important in determining extraction (Table 6). Price, on the other hand,
gives the surprising result that there is slightly less extraction with higher prices in
specifications I, II, and IV, and 1 percent increase in price leads to only .076 percent
increase in extraction in specification III.
The equation that describes the actual production in any given year when the
producer is assumed to be producing is:
log qwt = α0 + α1 logQwt + σεwt (8)
assuming an independent and identically distributed N(0, 1) error, ε. The regression
is estimated for each well type g24 and age group a. If there are less than 30
observations of production within a given type’s age group, then observations from
the age group of the type without clustering. Extraction from a well is truncated
to fall in the interval [qL, qU ] where the lower bound, qL, is 10−8 (not zero because
of the subsequent logarithm), and the upper bound, qU , is equal to the well’s per
well remaining reserves, Q, multiplied by a factor, κm, which depends on whether
the well is in a single-well pool m = 0 or a multi-well pool m = 1. In the dataset
24Groups depend on depth, initial pressure and density for gas and initial pressure water satura-
tion, temperature and depth for oil. There are many other factors that will influence the extraction
that are not accounted for in this regression, such as type of enhanced recovery method, gas to oil
ratio, current pressure, viscosity.
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there are a few observations where the amount produced in a year is greater than
the per well remaining reserves. This is more defensible in cases that the well is on
a multi-well pool because the well taps into the full reserve Q, not only the per well
reserve Q/n. But there are also observations from wells that are on their own pools
producing more than Q (6% of the production data would be classified as such),
giving evidence that the reserve size is on occasion an underestimate. Therefore, the
factor κm is equal to the 99
th percentile of the observed fractions qw/Qw (different
for single-well pools and multi-well pools). The 99th percentile is used, because there
are a few outliers where qw dramatically exceeds Qw. (That is, the 99
th percentile
of qw/Qw for gas wells on single-well pools, k0, is 2.9 compared to a maximum of 66
and for gas wells on multi-well pools k1 is 25.2 compared to a maximum of 807.)
The reserves are estimated reserves and prone to revisions. This implies that
the quantity extracted depends on what is believed to be in place, not what is
actually in place. This would mean that, for example, if the estimate of reserves
are revised to half of what was believed, then extraction would decrease correspond-
ingly, which is not realistic. To defend this choice for the model, many of the reserve
estimates increase due to an upward revision in the recovery factor, and therefore
an increase in recovery factor should increase the quantity recovered. And finally,
Figure 6 illustrates that there is a strong relationship between extraction and esti-
mated reserves, as does Table 6, which shows that a 1% increase in reserves leads
to a 32 to 56% increase in quantity extracted.
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Quantity Extracted
ln(Oil Production) ln(Gas Production)
I II III IV
Intercept 3.6696** -0.0182 Intercept -1.541** 0.2485
(0.0674) (1.0347) (0.1637) (0.2038)
ln(Qo) 0.3819** 0.323** ln(Qg) 0.5579** 0.3564**
(0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0023) (0.0034)
ln(Priceo) -0.0992** -0.0997** ln(Priceg) 0.0763** -0.1565**
(0.0146) (0.0164) (0.0133) (0.0142)
ln(Ageo) -0.156** -0.223** ln(Ageg) -0.1786** -0.1721**
(0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0049)
ln(Porosityo) -0.0403* ln(Porosityg) -0.2441**
(0.0182) (0.0181)
ln(Init. Pressureo) 0.4744** ln(Init. Pressureg) 0.0322*
(0.0240) (0.0154)
ln(Deptho) -0.4447** ln(Depthg) 0.1522**
(0.0475) (0.0215)
ln(Densityo) 0.3247 ln(Densityg) 0.5269**
(0.1408) (0.0671)
ln(No. Wellso) 0.0426** ln(No. Wellsg) -0.046**
(0.0033) (0.0033)




No. of Observations 89300 73329 No. of Observations 114961 92223
Log Likelihood -151456.1 -122952.9 Log Likelihood -218913.8 -172645.6
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of annual quantity produced. ∗∗ parameter estimates are





Figure 6: Scatterplot of Log Annual Production by Log Remaining Reserves for
Individual Wells
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5.1.2 Exogenous Transition in Reserves
The reserve estimates can increase or decrease by events other than production.
The recoverable reserves is an estimate of the oil or gas in place multiplied by the
recovery factor (the fraction of the oil or gas in place that is recoverable under
current technology and prices). The estimates of the oil or gas in place can increase
or decrease from new discoveries or revisions of the estimate, while the recoverable
reserves change with the same factors but also with technology and prices. In the
model, I use per well recoverable reserves Q, and therefore when a new well is drilled
the reserves also decrease. For the time being, I am estimating a single probability
density function for the exogenous decrease in reserves that includes decreases from
more wells being drilled as well as a decreases from reassessments of the estimate. To
measure the changes in reserves from all else other than production, the observations
on per well initial established reserves Q
IER
(IER=remaining reserves + cumulative
production) are used and not the observations on remaining reserves.
In the vast majority of the reserve data there is no change in per well initial es-




t equals one 78% of the time. The distribution
of the natural logarithm of changes that occurred is illustrated in Figure 7. I approx-
imate the distribution as two exponentials spliced together. When the price of oil
or gas is high, there is more exploration, more investments into enhanced recovery
and therefore, changes are also modeled to depend on price. Here I assume that
with higher prices the reserves grow more and decrease less, and with low prices
they grow less and decrease more. This is not necessarily the case because with
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higher prices there are more wells being drilled into the same pool, and the per well





can be approximated by an exponential distribution that depends on the price, as
when there is a decrease in reserves, and − ln(QIERt+1 /Q
IER
t ) can be approximated by
a different exponential distribution. That is, when there is an increase (or decrease),
∆ =
∣∣∣ln(QIERt+1 /QIERt )∣∣∣ follows an exponential distribution with density function:
fQ (∆|λ) = λ exp (−λ∆)
where λ is a function of price:
λ =

(φ0U + φ1UP )
−1 when increase,
































25The contradicting influence of price is one reason the coefficient on price for oil reserve in-
creases and decreases and gas reserve decreases is small and insignificant. Future research entails










































Figure 7: Histograms of the Natural Logarithm of Annual Change in Initial Estab-
lished Reserves (not including occurrences of no change)
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5.1.3 Transition in Price
Analysis of the price of oil is a well researched area, although there is little
consensus for the best fitting model. Models differ by allowing for mean-reversion
[Hammoudeh], unit roots [Perron, 1989], underlying market fundamentals [Yang
et al., 2002] or unexpected jumps [Gronwald, 2009, Tvedt] for example. I chose a
process that would fit easily into the Bellman equation. Specifically a price process
that follows an exogenous first order Markov process with only one state variable.
I am also able to incorporate a switching process between a high price and low
price regime without introducing “price regime” as a state variable in the model.
The regimes are determined depending on whether the price is above or below the
average price observed from 1971 to 2007. As soon as we know the price, we know
which regime we are in simply by knowing whether the price is above or below the
average price and there is no need to include the state variable for the regime. That
is, the final matrix of transition probability weights for price depends only on the
current price. The transition probability of switching from regime H to L is simply
the number of times that regime H was followed by regime L divided by the number
of times the process was in regime H.
p̂HL =
∑T
t=1 I{rt = L, rt−1 = H}∑T
t=1 I{rt−1 = H}
And vice versa for switching from L to H. For each regime, the parameters from a
regression with deviations from the mean logarithm of price, ℘t,r = logPt − µr, are
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estimated:
℘t,r = ϑr℘t−1,r + ςrεt (9)
where ε is independent and identically distributed N(0, 1). The process is truncated
so that price does not fall below P = 1E−6 (and not zero because of the subsequent
logarithm). The transition probability of price in regime r is:
FP (Pt|Pt−1, r) =




















The transition probability matrix is derived from a mixture of the distributions
under high and low price regimes, including the transition probabilities between the
two regimes:
FP (Pt|P ) =

pHHFP (Pt|Pt−1, r = H) + pHLFP (Pt|Pt−1, r = L) if P > P ,
pLHFP (Pt|Pt−1, r = H) + pLLFP (Pt|Pt−1, r = L) if P ≤ P .
.
5.2 Second Stage Estimation
For each different well type, g, a different set of structural parameters, θ2nd
= (C, M1, M2, SC(1→2), SC(2→1)) is estimated. The likelihood of observing the
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p(dwt |Pt, Qwt , Awt , θ2nd , θ̂1st)
where p is the multinomial logit given in equation 4 for the probability that well w
at time t chooses decision d. For each iteration of the likelihood there is a nested
subroutine to find the fixed point to the Bellman equation 3. The model is in discrete
time and the operator chooses the operating mode on a yearly basis. In reality this
decision is in continuous time however, a well is classified as an inactive well by
the ERCB if it has not reported any volumetric activity (production, injection, or
disposal) within the last 12 months. Therefore, the data are assigned as follows: for
an oil well in 2000, the current operating state, o, is the operating state in 1999,
where the decision, d, is the operating state in 2000, given the average wellhead
price of oil (or gas for gas wells) in 2000, the reserve size in 2000, and the age of the
well in 2000.
The royalty rate is calculated using formulas specified by the Alberta Depart-
ment of Energy[Fiscal, 2006]. The rates range from 5% to 35% depending on the
price of oil (or gas), when the reserve was discovered, and the volume of oil (or gas)
produced. As this model is based on the expected production, and not the actual
production, the royalty rate is the expected royalty rate. The government issues
a price threshold above which the royalty rate is price sensitive26 . This price is
slightly different every year, however in the estimation, the price threshold of 2006-
26Formulas can be found in [Fiscal, 2006]
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2007 is used for all years–which is reasonable as the past wellhead prices are inflated
to 2007 prices anyway.
The Alberta corporate income tax rate is 10% of taxable income while the
federal corporate income tax rate is 22.12%. The combined federal and provincial
tax rate on corporate income, τ , is set at 32.12%[Corporate, 2007].
Estimating the discount factor, β, along with the cost parameters is difficult.
For example, both a high reactivation cost and a low discount factor will prolong
reactivation. Therefore, I fixed the discount factor at .80. Deciding upon .80 was
through estimating the model at various fixed discount factors. When the discount
factor is set low, the parameter values for the fixed costs compensate by being
extremely low, and when the discount factor is very high, the parameter values for
the fixed cost and reactivation costs in exchange are very high. Discount factors in
the range of .75 and .95 result in the most evenly distributed parameter estimates.
Summing the log likelihoods of all well groups for different fixed discount factors, a
discount factor between .80 and .90 gives the highest likelihood (Figure 19). I choose
the discount factor to be .80, corresponding to an annualized discount rate of 22.31%
(β = exp(−r)). This is consistent with Farzin [1985] who estimated a before tax
discount rate in the oil and gas industry to be 25.4% and the Texas Comptroller’s
Property Tax Division that uses a range of discount rates from 17.29% to 22.52%
for oil and gas properties[Texas, 2007].
The model was estimated for many different specifications of the cost function
(Tables 7 and 8). A parsimonious specification that leads to timely convergence and
high likelihood values is specification 7 where the lifting cost depends on the reserve
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size and age, and the operating cost and reactivation cost depends on age.
Table 7: Specification of Cost Functions
Cost Lifting Costs Fixed Operating Fixed Idle Deactivation Reactivation
Spec (C) (M1) (M2) (SC1→2) (SC2→1)
1 θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5
2 θ1 + θ2/Q
2
θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
3 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A θ4 θ5 θ6 θ7
4 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A + θ4P θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8
5 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A + θ4P θ5 θ6 θ7 θ8P
6 θ1/Q
1.5




+ θ2(1 + θ3)A θ4(1 + θ5)A θ6 θ7 θ8(1 + θ9)A
8 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A + θ4P θ5(1 + θ6)A θ7 θ8 θ9(1 + θ10)A
9 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A θ4(1 + θ5)A θ6(1 + θ7)A θ8 θ9(1 + θ10)A
10 θ1 + θ2/Q
1.5
θ3 + θ4P θ5 + θ6P θ7 + θ8P θ9 + θ10P
11 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2P θ3(1 + θ4)A θ5 θ6(1 + θ7)A θ8(1 + θ9)A
12 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2P θ3 θ4 θ5(1 + θ6)A θ7(1 + θ8)A
13 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2P θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
14 θ1/Q
1.5
+ θ2(1 + θ3)A + θ4P θ5(1 + θ6)A θ7(1 + θ8)A θ9 θ10(1 + θ11)A
Notes: In all specifications the abandonment cost (SC1,2→3) is held fixed (at $75,000).
Table 8: Specification Search: Log-Likelihoods from PSAC Area 3 Gas Wells
Gas
Cost Spec Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Old New
1 -272.581 -3388.393 -3380.876 -4140.893
2 -272.581 -3388.392 -3336.074 -4145.124
3 -272.625 -3386.624† -3336.095 -4134.379
4 -272.776 -3584.931 -3358.012 -4165.348
5 -290.097 -3438.452 -3546.267 -4261.963
6 -282.194 -3411.877 -3435.400 -4220.655
7 -276.818 -3384.944 -3150.003* -3913.233*
8 -301.671† -3386.947 -3165.950 -3930.887
9 -280.258† -3411.778 -3221.193 -4027.607†
10 -709.548 -3363.691* -3343.370 -4576.699
11 -279.939 -3551.243 -3201.951† -3921.884†
12 -295.257† -3412.283† -3573.341† -4236.784†
13 -273.345† -3393.152† -3360.022 -4150.901†
14 -270.669* -3411.784 -3205.862 -4071.837
No. Obs. 961 12167 13647 14364
Notes: Old refers to wells drilled on pools discovered in 1974 or earlier, and new to wells on pools
discovered after 1973. β = .95 and b = 1. † indicates that the iteration limit was met. The
iteration limit was set at 1000 and although this is low, the specifications that converged did so
in 20 to 198 iterations.
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5.3 Third Stage Estimation: Maximizing the Full Likeli-
hood
The parameter estimates from the partial likelihood estimation are used as
starting values in the full likelihood. I make one Newton step on the full likelihood
in order to determine a consistent estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix for
the estimates. The weighted average of the estimated cost parameters and their
standard errors is calculated across all oil and gas well groups (Table 9) and for
groups of wells depending on whether they are in single-well pools or multi-well
pools and what royalty regime is applicable (Tables 11 and 12). The annual fixed
cost of leaving the well inactive, M2, and operating, M1, are negative because they
are interpreted relative to the decommissioning cost that for identification was fixed
at $75,000, SC(1,2→3) = .075. By construction of the multinomial logit (equation 4),
identifying all fixed costs of the model is not possible (for example, both π and aπ+b
will return the same decision rule). The location and scale of the profit function is
unidentifiable.
The standard errors are calculated using the misspecification consistent infor-
mation matrix, C(θ̂) = A(θ̂)−1B(θ̂)A(θ̂)−1 where A is the information matrix calcu-




, and B is the information matrix
calculated via the outer product of the gradient, B(θ̂) = E
(
∂ lnL(θ̂)/∂θ̂ · ∂ lnL(θ̂)/∂θ̂′
)
[White, 1982]. The standard errors obtained by the Hessian, bootstrapping, and the
misspecification consistent information matrix are not very different. In an example
well-group, (Table 13) estimating the partial likelihood and calculating the standard
errors via the Hessians for each partial likelihood results in the highest standard
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errors for the first stage parameters, and second highest for the second stage. Boot-
strapping was only performed on the second stage of the partial likelihood (again
using the parameters from the first stage). The bootstrapped standard errors for the
majority of the parameters are smaller than the asymptotic standard errors from
both the full and partial likelihood estimation. The estimated covariance matrix
for the second stage of the partial likelihood is not necessarily consistent because
the first stage parameters are taken to be the true parameters–and so the standard
errors from the full likelihood are also calculated. The asymptotic standard errors
in the full estimation are highest (roughly 70% of the time) when calculated via
the misspecification consistent form of the information matrix. However the differ-
ence is not very large; the misspecification consistent standard errors are usually
around two times as large as the standard errors calculated from the Hessian, but
still smaller than the standard errors calculated from the Hessians of the partial
likelihood.
In most cases the standard errors are much smaller than the parameter esti-
mates, however this is not the case of the parameter estimates of exogenous reserve
changes in oil reserves. This is perhaps one reason why the model does not match
the data as closely for oil as it does for gas (section 5.4). The standard errors are
extremely large for oil wells on multi-well “new” pools. Upon closer inspection, this
is driven by one well group (PSAC 3 cluster 3 with 18677 observations).
58
Table 9: Weighted Average Parameter Estimates from the Full Likelihood
Parameter Oil Gas
Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
Reserves
α0,1 0.3113 (0.2825) 3.3777 (1.2456)
α0,5 0.2748 (0.4845) 2.3709 (0.2833)
α0,15 0.0824 (0.2217) 2.1707 (0.7497)
α0,30 -0.2245 (0.2535) 2.8161 (0.8220)
α1,1 0.4163 (0.0790) 0.4280 (0.1408)
α1,5 0.2841 (0.1475) 0.4840 (0.0320)
α1,15 0.3022 (0.0699) 0.5218 (0.0809)
α1,30 0.4288 (0.1075) 0.4444 (0.2436)
σ1 1.2958 (0.0222) 1.4891 (0.0504)
σ5 1.2833 (0.0319) 1.5246 (0.0831)
σ15 1.2687 (0.0233) 1.5241 (0.0990)
σ30 1.1835 (0.0997) 1.3777 (1.2539)
φ0,U 0.3728 (0.0350) 0.2681 (0.0249)
φ1,U 2.042e-7 (0.8019) 573.5992 (130.2248)
φ0,D 0.6911 (0.1574) 0.4358 (0.4249)
φ1,D 5.151e-9 (0.0062) 6.450e-5 (7.485e-5)
Price
ϑL 0.4380 (1.4361) 0.7076 (0.7005)
ςL 0.1555 (0.7744) 0.1697 (0.2973)
ϑH 0.6195 (0.1136) 0.5958 (0.3084)
ςH 0.1449 (0.0505) 0.2133 (0.0562)
Cost Parameters
θ1 (C) 0.0097 (0.0436) 0.0729 (0.4800)
θ2 (C) 0.0117 (0.0214) 0.0001 (3.3169e-5)
θ3 (C) 0.1562 (0.1569) 0.0824 (0.0307)
θ4 (M1) -0.9883 (0.8389) -1.6392 (0.4028)
θ5 (M1) -0.1077 (0.0317) -0.0096 (0.0993)
θ6 (M2) -1.0387 (0.0174) -0.7405 (0.0976)
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 3.7367 (1.1268) 1.7304 (0.7120)
θ8 (SC(2→1)) 0.1641 (3.9543) 2.0714 (1.4891)
θ9 (SC(2→1)) -0.5551 (0.3703) -0.0299 (0.0188)
Notes: Parameters of cost specification 7. These are the weighted average of the estimates across
well groups.
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Notes: P is measured in millions of dollars per thousand m3 of gas and millions of dollars per
thousand barrels of oil
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Table 11: Weighted Average of Full Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Different
Types of Oil Wells
Oil
Parameter Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Third Old New Third
Reserves
α0,1 -0.012(0.250) 0.679(0.250) 0.310(0.250) -0.881(0.250) -0.113(0.250) 0.798(0.250)
α0,5 0.104(0.427) 0.187(0.427) 0.525(0.427) -0.232(0.427) -0.242(0.427) 0.549(0.427)
α0,15 0.130(0.194) 0.280(0.194) -0.008(0.194) -0.307(0.194) -0.365(0.194) 0.649(0.194)
α0,30 -0.039(0.223) -0.173(0.223) 0.017(0.223) -0.764(0.223) -0.613(0.223) -0.403(0.223)
α1,1 0.481(0.070) 0.297(0.070) 0.489(0.070) 0.598(0.070) 0.490(0.070) 0.331(0.070)
α1,5 0.314(0.130) 0.301(0.130) 0.244(0.130) 0.360(0.130) 0.427(0.130) 0.308(0.130)
α1,15 0.320(0.061) 0.223(0.061) 0.359(0.061) 0.369(0.061) 0.385(0.061) 0.212(0.061)
α1,30 0.420(0.094) 0.383(0.094) 0.395(0.094) 0.559(0.094) 0.496(0.094) 0.484(0.094)
σ1 1.304(0.020) 1.301(0.020) 1.267(0.020) 1.290(0.020) 1.362(0.020) 1.173(0.020)
σ5 1.345(0.028) 1.266(0.028) 1.277(0.028) 1.267(0.028) 1.121(0.028) 1.331(0.028)
σ15 1.303(0.021) 1.274(0.021) 1.273(0.021) 1.228(0.021) 1.230(0.021) 1.142(0.021)
σ30 1.201(0.090) 1.130(0.090) 1.177(0.090) 1.305(0.090) 1.278(0.090) 1.317(0.090)
φ0,U 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031) 0.373(0.031)
φ1,U 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717) 2e-7(0.717)
φ0,D 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141) 0.691(0.141)
φ1,D 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006) 5e-9(0.006)
Price
ϑL 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266) 0.438(1.266)
ςL 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702) 0.155(0.702)
ϑH 0.620(0.101) 0.620(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101) 0.619(0.101)
ςH 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044) 0.145(0.044)
Cost Param.
θ1 (C) 0.033(0.038) 0.000(0.038) 0.005(0.038) 0.028(0.038) 0.007(0.038) 0.010(0.038)
θ2 (C) 0.012(0.019) 0.004(0.019) 0.019(0.019) 0.003(0.019) 0.002(0.019) 0.012(0.019)
θ3 (C) 0.354(0.138) 0.077(0.138) 0.042(0.138) 0.644(0.138) 0.514(0.138) 0.037(0.138)
θ4 (M1) -1.771(0.735) -0.291(0.735) -1.078(0.735) -3.512(0.735) -2.411(0.735) -1.062(0.735)
θ5 (M1) -0.103(0.028) -0.128(0.028) -0.035(0.028) -0.194(0.028) -0.154(0.028) -0.052(0.028)
θ6 (M2) -1.073(0.015) -0.792(0.015) -1.147(0.015) -1.020(0.015) -1.430(0.015) -2.414(0.015)
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 4.011(0.991) 2.341(0.991) 4.417(0.991) 4.827(0.991) 1.330(0.991) 5.399(0.991)
θ8 (SC(2→1)) -5.734(3.818) 1.093(3.818) 3.445(3.818) -4.772(3.818) 3.088(3.818) -5.784(3.818)
θ9 (SC(2→1)) -0.459(0.337) -0.262(0.337) -0.761(0.337) -0.429(0.337) -0.289(0.337) -0.625(0.337)
Notes: Parameters of cost specification 7. These are the weighted average of the estimates across
PSAC areas and clusters. In parenthesis are the weighted average of the standard errors
calculated by the misspecification consistent version of the information matrix.
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Table 12: Weighted Average of Full Likelihood Parameter Estimates for Different
Types of Gas Wells
Gas
Parameter Single-Well Pool Multi-Well Pool
Old New Old New
Reserves
α0,1 3.2222 (0.0735) 3.5797 (0.0778) 3.1326 (0.4116) 3.4648 (3.0257)
α0,5 1.8686 (0.0383) 2.9016 (0.0481) 1.7393 (0.4192) 2.5924 (0.3488)
α0,15 1.8459 (0.0819) 2.7575 (0.0556) 1.4052 (0.1241) 2.4687 (1.9315)
α0,30 2.2226 (0.0611) 3.3901 (0.2310) 1.8580 (0.4209) 3.3240 (1.7113)
α1,1 0.4133 (0.0084) 0.4177 (0.0086) 0.4324 (0.0462) 0.4326 (0.3425)
α1,5 0.5073 (0.0053) 0.4375 (0.0076) 0.5274 (0.0491) 0.4772 (0.0358)
α1,15 0.5436 (0.0105) 0.4636 (0.0066) 0.5926 (0.0155) 0.4979 (0.2058)
α1,30 0.5082 (0.0077) 0.3758 (0.0308) 0.5512 (0.0545) 0.3914 (0.6050)
σ1 1.5116 (0.0016) 1.4743 (0.0028) 1.4987 (0.0132) 1.4902 (0.1260)
σ5 1.5083 (0.0015) 1.5171 (0.0047) 1.5073 (0.0100) 1.5481 (0.2195)
σ15 1.5777 (0.0022) 1.4787 (0.0084) 1.5750 (0.0121) 1.5077 (0.2587)
σ30 1.5270 (0.0010) 1.2959 (0.0437) 1.5017 (0.0086) 1.3139 (3.4687)
φ0,U 0.2291 (0.0049) 0.2904 (0.0076) 0.2291 (0.0245) 0.2904 (0.0397)
φ1,U 346.3773 (24.2742) 703.4817 (38.3561) 346.3773 (128.5903) 703.4817 (209.1606)
φ0,D 1.4e-5 (0.0630) 0.6860 (0.0309) 1.4e-5 (0.0552) 0.6838 (1.1583)
φ1,D 1.0e-5 (1.265e-5) 4.5e-5 (5.7e-6) 9.5e-5 (1.1e-5) 4.5e-5 (6.3e-6)
Price
ϑL 0.7076 (0.8605) 0.7076 (0.1456) 0.7076 (0.3925) 0.7076 (1.4235)
ςL 0.1697 (0.6758) 0.1697 (0.0686) 0.1697 (0.0107) 0.1697 (0.7332)
ϑH 0.5958 (0.0291) 0.5956 (0.0669) 0.5959 (0.2178) 0.5958 (0.5995)
ςH 0.2133 (0.0053) 0.2133 (0.0529) 0.2133 (0.0308) 0.2133 (0.0859)
Cost Parameters
θ1 (C) 0.2890 (0.5415) 0.1324 (0.1198) 0.0880 (0.1801) 0.0004 (1.0482)
θ2 (C) 7.2e-5 (3.7e-5) 1.6e-4 (2.1e-5) 2.0e-4 (3.0e-5) 9.3e-5 (1.1e-5)
θ3 (C) 0.1368 (0.0190) 0.0189 (0.0100) 0.0086 (0.0129) 0.2006 (0.0646)
θ4 (M1) -1.5761 (0.8891) -1.6003 (0.1449) -1.7024 (0.1828) -1.6118 (0.7917)
θ5 (M1) -0.0294 (0.1413) -0.0044 (0.0039) -0.0019 (0.0050) -0.0202 (0.2628)
θ6 (M2) -0.6956 (0.0782) -0.7463 (0.0443) -0.8102 (0.0188) -0.6710 (0.2165)
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 0.8997 (0.7921) 1.5201 (0.2393) 2.3127 (0.2868) 1.3755 (1.4883)
θ8 (SC(2→1)) 3.9745 (2.0169) 2.5734 (0.1688) 0.4862 (0.3893) 3.1112 (3.5563)
θ9 (SC(2→1)) -0.0005 (0.0150) 0.0156 (0.0014) -0.1282 (0.0026) 0.0279 (0.0482)
Notes: Parameters of cost specification 7. These are the weighted average of the estimates across
PSAC areas and clusters. In parenthesis are the weighted average standard errors.
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Table 13: Example of Different Standard Errors from Partial and Full Likelihood
Parameter Partial Likelihood Full Likelihood
Estimate Std.Err. Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Std.Err.
(hessian) (boot) (hessian) (White)
Reserves
α0,1 3.0830 (0.1475) 3.0807 (0.0554) (0.0780)
α0,5 2.1399 (0.1610) 2.1422 (0.0286) (0.1601)
α0,15 2.7343 (0.1957) 2.7379 (0.0324) (0.0180)
α0,30 3.2357 (0.1955) 3.2327 (0.2107) (0.5245)
α1,1 0.3351 (0.0184) 0.3334 (0.0064) (0.0087)
α1,5 0.4295 (0.0203) 0.4319 (0.0016) (0.0177)
α1,15 0.4172 (0.0246) 0.4227 (0.0054) (0.0020)
α1,30 0.3787 (0.0251) 0.3747 (0.0277) (0.0655)
σ1 1.2094 (0.0139) 1.2100 (0.0136) (0.0010)
σ5 1.2671 (0.0166) 1.2677 (0.0171) (0.0018)
σ15 1.5194 (0.0256) 1.5202 (0.0211) (0.0432)
σ30 1.4141 (0.0245) 1.4141 (0.0214) (0.0244)
φ0,U 0.2291 (0.0244) 0.2291 (0.0078) (0.0072)
φ1,U 346.3773 (120.0978) 346.3773 (12.2214) (28.7837)
φ0,D 1.44e-5 (0.0670) 1.37e-5 (0.0211) (0.1232)
φ1,D 1.02e-4 ( 1.34e-5) 9.93e-5 (2.76e-6) (2.16e-5 )
Price
ϑL 0.7076 (0.1045) 0.7076 (0.0519) (0.1249)
ςL 0.1697 (0.0291) 0.1697 (0.0398) (0.0758)
ϑH 0.5959 (0.1373) 0.5957 (0.0172) (0.0079)
ςH 0.2133 (0.0346) 0.2133 (0.0239) (0.0890)
Cost Param.
θ1 (C) 0.0817 (0.0306) (0.0151) 0.0817 (0.0207) (0.0467)
θ2 (C) 2.45e-4 (1.11e-4) ( 3.01e-5) 2.45e-4 (5.57e-5) (1.52e-4)
θ3 (C) 0.0036 (0.0140) (0.0014) 0.0036 (0.0103) (0.0154)
θ4 (M1) -1.9647 (0.0627) (0.0058) -1.9634 (0.0395) (0.0751)
θ5 (M1) -0.0087 (0.0019) (0.0016) -0.0087 (0.0012) (0.0024)
θ6 (M2) -0.6089 (0.0235) (0.0134) -0.6085 (0.0193) (0.0041)
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 1.5024 (0.0256) (0.0030) 1.5026 (0.0526) (0.0786)
θ8 (SC(2→1)) 3.1373 (0.0912) (0.0018) 3.1377 (0.0473) (0.0659)
θ9 (SC(2→1)) 0.0173 (0.0021) (0.0018) 0.0173 (0.0017) (0.0004)
LL 20346.6481 20353.9227
Notes: Example from PSAC area 3 cluster 1 well on single-well “old” pool. “hessian” are the
standard errors calculated from the information matrix via the Hessian; “boot” are the standard
errors from bootstrapping the data with replacement 30 times; “White” are the standard errors
derived from the misspecification consistent information matrix.
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5.4 Goodness-of-Fit Tests
To test the dynamic programming model’s ability to fit the data, the choice
probabilities from the estimated dynamic programming model p(d|s, θ̂), are com-
pared to the observed (nonparametric) estimates of the conditional choice proba-
bility function p̂(d|s). The nonparametric estimate p̂ is the sample histogram of
choices made in the subsample of wells with state s. Following Rust and Phelan
[1997] and Rothwell and Rust [1997], by sample enumeration, if S is a collection of










I{di = d, si ∈ S}
Where F̂ (ds|S) is the nonparametric estimate of the conditional probability distri-
bution of s given S, equal to the number of observations in cell ds divided by the
total number of observations in all cells that comprise S. This is compared to the














p(d|s, θ̂g)I{sig ∈ S}
Where p(d|s, θ̂g) is the probability given by equation 4 and θ̂g are the estimates
of the structural parameters for group g.
Table 14 shows the observed (non-parametric) choice probabilities along side
the expected choice probabilities from dynamic programming model for oil and gas
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wells. The three panels in Table 14 show: the case that S is a collection of all
possible s cells, S is a collection of wells that are active, and S is a collection of
wells that are inactive. The dynamic programming model does a very good job in
predicting the overall observed choice probabilities (Table 14 and by group (Table
19 in the Appendix). For the operating state of gas wells, the chi-squared test
cannot reject the dynamic programming model at the 70% significance level. The
chi-squared test rejects the model for oil wells, however, it still does a very good job
in predicting the choice probabilities (it is not off by more than a percentage point).
The model is able to predict the very small probability of decommissioning
a well. For example, the observed proportion of active gas wells in the subsample
that are decommissioned is .0046, and the expected probability from the dynamic
programming model for that sample of wells to be decommissioned is .0043.
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Table 14: Actual versus Predicted Choice Probabilities
Oil Gas
Current State:
Active or Inactive Observed Expected Observed Expected
Pr(Active) 0.6207 0.6277 0.6878 0.6884
Pr(Inactivate) 0.3683 0.3621 0.3026 0.3021
Pr(Decommission) 0.0110 0.0102 0.0096 0.0094




Pr(Active) 0.9253 0.9310 0.9421 0.9428
Pr(Inactivate) 0.0691 0.0630 0.0534 0.0528
Pr(Decommission) 0.0056 0.0060 0.0046 0.0043




Pr(Activate) 0.0660 0.0750 0.1105 0.1108
Pr(Inactive) 0.9132 0.9071 0.8685 0.8682
Pr(Decommission) 0.0209 0.0179 0.0210 0.0210
No. Obs. 53198 56952
χ2 85.9339 0.0636
Marg.Sig. 0 0.9687
Notes: The chi-square test statistic was calculated as
χ2 = N
∑3
d=1 (ObsPr(d) − ExpPr(d))2/ExpPr(d) , where N is the number of observations.
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6 Simulation
Having estimated the structural parameters in the model of the operating
choice, the model can be used to simulate the choices made by operators if any of
the parameters or state variables are changed. The structural estimation can predict
the industry’s reaction to counterfactual scenarios that have not been previously
observed. Before performing counterfactual simulations, I first validate the model
by simulating the industry in 2000 to 2007 to see how well it matches reality. I
then simulate the industry from 1993 to 1999, a period that was not used in the
estimation, to see how well the model matches the data. After these descriptive
measures, the model is used as a prescriptive tool to see the effect of taxing inactive
wells.
6.1 Validation: In-Sample Simulation
Figure 8 illustrates the in-sample predictions from the dynamic programming
model. The simulation begins with the state of the industry in 2000 as the starting
point. Each year each well becomes a year older, and the current operating state and
reserve size evolve according to the state dependent choice probabilities for the well
type. The choice is determined from a pseudorandom draw from the probability
density of the choice. To determine whether there is an exogenous increase or
decrease to the reserve estimates I take a pseudorandom draw from the probability
denstiy of an increase or a decrease. The magnitude of the increase or decrease is
determined by a draw from the exponential distribution that depends on the price
and reserve size. If the decision is to activate, and the well is the only well in the
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pool, the remaining reserves decrease by a random draw from fq(·|Q,A). If there
is more than one well in the pool then the reserves decrease by this amount under
any operating choice. The price of the hydrocarbon is not simulated and each year
the real wellhead price is used. In order to make the simulated number of wells
comparable to the actual number of wells, I only include wells that are observed
in every year from 2000 to 2007; there being any intermittent missing years is due
to missing information on some pools in some years. Figure 8 depicts the 90%
confidence interval around the average prediction from 30 simulations for oil and
gas wells. The model is able to match the data closely for the first year of the
simulation for both oil and gas wells, but over time gas wells continue to match the
data while the oil wells deviate. The simulation of oil wells over-predicts the number
of inactive wells and under-predicts the number of active wells. The prediction for
the number of wells decommissioned matches the data for both oil and gas wells.
There is a dip in the simulated quantity of gas extracted in 2002, as that year had
the lowest in-sample price (of $123.77/E3m3 compared to a high of $293.90/E3m3
in 2005) and the model proves to be overly sensitive to low prices.
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(a) Composition of Oil Wells
























(b) Composition of Gas Wells

























(c) Production from Oil Wells



























(d) Production from Gas Wells























(e) Reserves for Oil Wells




























(f) Reserves for Gas Wells
Figure 8: In-Sample Real and Simulated Data
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6.2 Validation: Out-of-sample simulations
Another test is to see how the model predicts out-of-sample decisions that were
not used to estimate the parameters. The parameters estimated using observations
from 2000 to 2007 are used to predict the decisions from 1993 to 1999. The out-of-
sample predictions for the number of wells decommissioned match the data closely
(Figure 9); the predictions for the number of active and inactive wells match the
data only somewhat closely in the first year (for example, the number of active oil
wells is under-predicted by 7% and for gas wells, 9%) only to diverge with time (by
the end of the simulation the number of active oil wells is under-predicted by 18%
and by 20% for gas wells). The simulation under predicts the number of active wells,
and therefore under predicts production. There are two reasons that recreating the
out-of-sample data is a difficult task. The first is due to the quality of the out-of-
sample data on reserves, and the second is that the range of hydrocarbon prices
substantially differ from the in-sample. In order to obtain reserve information for
the years 1993 to 1999 the pools that were last reviewed before 2000 are used. The
remaining reserves are created by subtracting the cumulative production up to the
review year from the estimate of initial established reserves of that year. This allows
for a starting point of the last reviewed year for simulating the path of a well. The
out-of-sample differs from the in-sample in a fundamental way: the pools in the
out-of-sample are not reviewed as frequently as the majority of the pools used in
the estimation. Furthermore, the price range is quite different: the in-sample prices
range from $120 to $294 per e3m3 of natural gas, but the out-of-sample prices range
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from $53 to $83 per e3m3. And as can be seen in the in-sample simulation as well,
the model tends to overestimate the industry’s reaction to low prices.
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Figure 9: Out of Sample Prediction 1993-1999
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6.3 Counterfactual Simulations
The reason that operators are allowed to postpone decommissioning their wells
is to facilitate the reactivation of their wells should operating conditions become
more favorable. However, if a well is not going to be brought back into production,
then decommissioning should not be postponed because the sooner a well is decom-
missioned, the sooner that the land might be reused, and the less chance there is
for contaminants to enter drinking water, surface or the atmosphere. The laissez-
faire regulations for decommissioning wells in Alberta only pay off if the conditions
that producers claim to be waiting for materialize and wells are brought back into
production. The model here is used to simulate the industry under different scenar-
ios that should be ideal for production, such as high prices and improved recovery
technology, just what operators are waiting for, to see if wells will be reactivated.
Table 15: Outline of Counterfactual Simulations
Scenarios Effect on Activity
Ideal Scenarios
High recovery factors (1 year in-sample) 100% recovery, 3%-point higher reactivation
High prices (1 year in-sample) 1.5× EIA high price, 6%-point higher reactivation
High recovery factors (12 year forecast) 100% recovery, 1-5% more active wells
High prices (12 year forecast) 2.1-3.3×baseline price, 6-21% more active wells
Low reactivation costs (12 year forecast) 25% lower, 15-25% more active wells
Non-ideal Scenarios
Low prices (12 year forecast) 2.3×less than baseline, 6-9% less active wells
High royalty rate (12 year forecast) 50% royalty, 3.7-8.5% less active wells
Tax on inactivity (12 year forecast) $3000 inactivity tax, <1% more active wells
First I predict the choice probabilities in the subsample after changing the state
variables price and reserve size from what was observed. I also simulate a 12 year
forecast to 2020 using 2007 as a starting point. I do this for a baseline case of what
73
is expected of the industry should states progress as they have in the past and then
compare the baseline to various counterfactuals. If the number of inactive wells does
not decrease when prices or recovery rates increase (to unrealistical levels), then this
implies that operators are not waiting for high prices or increased recovery. However
it could be that the operators are waiting for an improvement in technology that
would come in the form of reduced reactivation costs, and as soon as it becomes
cheaper to reactivate, the inactive wells will be brought back into production. The
model predicts that a probable increase in the profit from extracting is not enough to
incite operators to reactivate wells, and so relying on increases in prices or recovery
rates to spur reactivations is not warranted. Relying on technology improvements
to reduce the reactivation costs might be warranted because the model predicts that
lowering the reactivation cost will substantially increase reactivations. However, it is
more difficult to say what a probable reduction in reactivation costs might be because
I do not observe the impact of past technological improvements in reactivation as I
do in the case of recovery rates.
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6.3.1 Overall Choice Probability Under Increased Recoverable Reserves
In a first scenario a hypothetical technology change increases the recovery rate
of all pools to 100%. According to the reserve data, recovery rates range from 15%
to 95% with an average of 67% for gas and from .01% to 90% with an average
of 12% for oil27. Changing the recovery rate to 100% moves the mean average
reserve size, Q, from 14,696e3m3 to 51,782e3m3. The expected average production
would increase to 5,116e3m3 as compared to the observed average of 2,560e3m3. The
model’s predicted choice probabilities match the observed choice probabilities before
applying the hypothetical scenarios (the first two columns of Table 16). The average
reserve size and age listed in Table 16 (as well as price) are the state variables that
the choice probabilities are based on, and therefore are the same. The average
quantity extracted is the predicted quantity given the reserve size and age of the
wells. The third column shows that increasing recovery rates to 100% only increases
the overall probability of activity by a little less than 2 percentage points, and
increases the probability of inactive wells to be activated by 6 percentage points,
indicating the extent of the hysteresis of inactivity. Upon first glance this seems to
be an implausible prediction, and so to justify it, the observed probability of activity
for wells on hydrocarbon rich and poor reserves is compared (Table 17).
The wells that have less than 5,000e3m3 are only 2.6 percentage points less
likely to be active as those with reserves greater than 10,000e3m3. This might lead
27For gas, the average recovery rate calculated from the data on gas pools matches the average
recovery rate in the ERCB’s publication on Alberta’s energy reserves [ERCB, 2008]. However, for
oil my calculated average recovery rate differs from the ERCB’s, where recovery rates for oil are
said to range from 5% to over 50%, with an average of 26%
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Table 16: Actual versus Predicted Choice Probabilities Under Different Scenarios




Pr(Activate) 0.6878 0.6884 0.7051 0.7183
Pr(Inactivate) 0.3026 0.3021 0.2865 0.2735
Pr(Abandon) 0.0096 0.0094 0.0084 0.0082
No. Obs. 186274 186274 186274 186274
Mean Q 14696.3049 14696.3049 51782.4453 14696.3049
Mean Age 15.0276 15.0276 15.0276 15.0276
Mean q 3272.4195 2560.1683 5116.5363 2509.6345
Active
Pr(Active) 0.9421 0.9428 0.9526 0.9578
Pr(Inactivate) 0.0534 0.0528 0.0439 0.0391
Pr(Abandon) 0.0046 0.0043 0.0035 0.0031
Inactive
Pr(Activate) 0.1105 0.1108 0.1430 0.1745
Pr(Inactive) 0.8685 0.8682 0.8375 0.8059
Pr(Abandon) 0.0210 0.0210 0.0196 0.0196
one to question the relation between reserves and productivity, but as shown in the
row indicating the average quantity produced (9th row of Table 17), wells with higher
reserves are indeed more productive. The expected quantity produced is calculated
for all wells depending on their well type, age, and reserve size and the parameter-
ized probability density function for extraction, fq(q|Q,A, α). The model slightly
underpredicts the quantity produced from a well. However, the chi-squared good-
ness of fit shows that the model closely matches the observed choice probabilities
for both the large and small reserves, and cannot be rejected at the 1% significance
level. The small-reserve wells and large-reserve wells differ slightly by their age, and
may differ by geographic location, so in an experiment, the remaining reserves in
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Table 17: Influence of Reserve Size
Current State: QSmall QLarge QSmall⇒QLarge
Active or Inactive Observed Expected Observed Expected Experiment
Pr(Activate) 0.6785 0.6782 0.7040 0.7061 0.6946
Pr(Inactivate) 0.3108 0.3114 0.2882 0.2865 0.2959
Pr(Abandon) 0.0106 0.0104 0.0078 0.0075 0.0095
No. Obs. 102024 102024 56527 56527 102024
χ2 0.5549 1.8576
Marg. Sig. 0.7577 0.3950
Mean Q 1797.8571 1797.8571 41642.0035 41642.0035 41859.7134
Mean Age 16.3845 16.3845 13.4828 13.4828 16.3845
Mean q 1141.0560 713.2404 7362.3941 5287.9515 4915.5162
Active
Pr(Active) 0.9399 0.9393 0.9474 0.9500 0.9492
Pr(Inactivate) 0.0555 0.0559 0.0482 0.0463 0.0468
Pr(Abandon) 0.0046 0.0047 0.0044 0.0036 0.0039
No. Obs. 70440 70440 39547 39547 70440
χ2 0.4664 10.1006
Marg. Sig. 0.7920 0.0064
Inactive
Pr(Activate) 0.0957 0.0958 0.1370 0.1378 0.1267
Pr(Inactive) 0.8802 0.8811 0.8472 0.8458 0.8516
Pr(Abandon) 0.0241 0.0231 0.0157 0.0164 0.0218
No. Obs. 31584 31584 16980 16980 31584
χ2 1.3412 0.6127
Marg. Sig. 0.5114 0.7361
Notes: The “QSmall” subsample includes any observation where Q ≤ 5, 000e3m3, and the
“QLarge” subsample includes any observation where Q ≥ 10, 000e3m3. The mean q is the average
expected production from a given well in one year. The expected production depends on the
well’s age, Q and the parameters of fq(q|Q,A, α) that were estimated in the first stage.
the subsample with small reserves are increased to be of the same distribution as
the reserves in the subsample with large reserves. This will show how much of the
difference in the choice probabilities comes from the reserve size. As seen, the prob-
ability to be active and the average expected quantity extracted increases when the
reserves are increased. That the probability to be active and the quantity produced
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is smaller in the wells with increased reserves than the large-reserve wells is due to
a difference in the proportion of different well types and age of the two groups.
6.3.2 Overall Choice Probability Under Increased Price
A second scenario examines the choice probabilities when there is a high gas
price. In the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook of
2009 the “high price” case for 2030 is $308.29/e3m3 for natural gas at the wellhead28
[EIAproj]. This is only slightly more than the wellhead price in Alberta in 2005
($293.90/e3m3 (2007 dollars)), and so I use 1.5 times their high price as the high
price scenario. This results in 3 percentage point increase in the probability of
activating an inactive well.
Table 16 shows that exposing the industry to an extreme scenario for one year
has only a very small effect on the operating decisions. It is also worthwhile to
explore the effect that many years of an extreme hypothetical scenario has on the
industry. Therefore, a forecast of the industry from 2007 through to 2020 is made
under a baseline for the most likely case to be compared to different extreme cases
for both oil and gas wells. The baseline forecast takes the state in 2007 of all wells
in the sample as an initial state and allows the state variables to change according
to the probability densities estimated from the 2000-2007 data. Figures 11 to 14
depict the baseline scenario forecast (solid lines) superimposed on the forecasts of
different extreme scenarios (dotted lines).
28converted from Mcf to e3m3 using 35.314 Mcf/e3m3
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6.3.3 12 Year Forecast Under High Recovery Rates
Figure 10 demonstrates the unrealistic scenario of increasing the recovery fac-
tor so that all of the gas or oil in-place is recoverable (currently 67% of the gas-in-
place and 12% of oil-in-place is recoverable). In the case of gas, production from
producing wells increases, however this increased profitability is not incentive enough
to reactivate many inactive gas wells (there are only 5.6% more active wells). In the
case of oil, the increased recovery rates does not change the number of active wells
by the end of the period (there are only 1% more active wells). This reiterates that
an increase in recovery that is realistic is not enough to induce the reactivation of
inactive wells.
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Figure 10: Forecast under Baseline and 100% Recoverable Reserves
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6.3.4 12 Year Forecast Under High Prices
Figure 11 shows the forecast when operators receive a constant “high price”
of $197.72/bbl for oil and $462.44/e3m3 for gas29. In reality the operator would
notice that they are receiving a constant high price and then update their beliefs
for the price process, however in this simulation the transition probability density
for the future price stays the same as that estimated from the price path from 1971
to 2007. On average over the 50 simulations, by 2020 there are only 6.6% more
gas wells that are active under the high price scenario as compared to the baseline
prediction, where the high price for gas is 2.1 times the average forecasted price of
the baseline in 2020. For oil, the high price is 3.3 times the average forecasted price
of the baseline in 2020, and this leads to 21% more wells that are active. Oil wells
are reactivated more readily under high prices than gas wells, however, a high price
does not spur as much reserve growth in oil reserves as it does for gas reserves. In the
case of oil, the growth in reserves does not compensate for the increased production,
so that after 12 years there are fewer oil reserves than in the baseline case. For gas
reserves, the high price results in more reserve growth showing that the expected
returns from investments in exploration or enhancing production are greater for gas
than oil. By 2020 under the high price there are 133% more reserves and 104%
more production than in the baseline case. The gas wells that are active result in
producing more, however these conditions of increased reserves and increased prices
are not sufficient to induce many inactive gas wells to be reactivated.
29This is equal to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook of 2009
“high price” case in 2030 for oil, and 1.5 times the “high price” for gas
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Figure 11: Forecast under Baseline and High Price Scenarios
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6.3.5 12 Year Forecast Under Reduced Reactivation Costs
If technology changed in a way that reactivating inactive wells became cheaper,
then there should be more wells reactivated and more total production. Figure 12
shows a forecast of the industry when there is a 25% reduction in the cost to reac-
tivate, SC(2→1). For both oil and gas wells, as expected, more wells are reactivated.
Each year there are still more wells that are deactivated than reactivated, however
the pace at which this occurs is slowed. In the case of gas, by 2020 there are 14%
more active wells, 12% more production and 11% less remaining reserves. In the
case of oil, the simulation ends with 25% more active wells, 27% more production,
and 10% less reserves.
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Figure 12: Forecast under Baseline and SC(2→1) 75% Cheaper
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6.3.6 12 Year Forecast Under Low Prices
Recently the price of natural gas hit its seven year low, mainly due to increased
production of natural gas from shale gas and inventories reaching record high levels.
The September 2009 wellhead price, $103.12/E3m3, is almost two times lower than
the EIA’s “low” price scenario for natural gas. I examine what the conventional
natural gas and oil production would look like after 12 years of sustained low prices
(Figure 13), using wellhead prices of $91/E3m3 for natural gas and $25/bbl. Re-
coverable gas reserves are more price sensitive and after 12 years, there are 10% less
remaining recoverable gas reserves than the baseline. In the case of oil, there is less
extraction and reserve growth does not change, so there are 18% more remaining
recoverable oil reserves than the baseline. The number of wells that are abandoned
does not significantly increase when there are low prices. Most of the switching
between states is comes from active wells becoming inactive resulting in less pro-
duction. Under low prices the model predicts that there are 6% less active gas wells,
62% less gas production, 9% less active oil wells and 35% less oil production than
in the baseline.
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Figure 13: Forecast under Baseline and Low Price Scenarios
86
6.3.7 12 Year Forecast with Tax on Inactive Wells
Implementing a $3,000 tax each year that a well is left inactive has the least
repercussions out of the scenarios. There is less than a percent increase in the
number of active gas wells, 4% increase in gas production, and less than a percent
increase in reserves (a decrease would have been expected). For the case of oil,
there is 0.7% increase in active wells, 2% decrease in production and 0.4% increase
in reserves. A tax on inactive wells makes the options of reactivating or decom-
missioning more favorable, but it is not immediately obvious which of these states
becomes more preferred. Therefore, I simulate the industry up to 2020 under differ-
ent levels of the tax (Figure 15), and it becomes immediately apparent that a tax
results in more gas wells being reactivated than decommissioned. In the case of oil,
a tax results in wells being decommissioned and reactivated. There is a threshold
at which nearly all inactive wells are either decommissioned or reactivated, and the
fraction that are decommissioned or reactivated does not change with an increase
in the tax. The second panel of Figure 15 shows that the cumulative production by
2020 increases with a higher inactivity tax, but levels out as higher taxes no longer
increase the number of wells reactivated.
87



















(a) Composition of Oil Wells

























(b) Composition of Gas Wells
























(c) Production from Oil Wells




























(d) Production from Gas Wells



























(e) Reserves for Oil Wells






























(f) Reserves for Gas Wells
Figure 14: Forecast under Baseline and with $3000 Annual Inactivity Fee
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Figure 15: Effect of Tax on Inactivity
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6.3.8 12 Year Forecast with Increased Royalty Rates
Hysteresis in the operating state implies that changes in royalty rates have
a muffled influence on the operating state of already drilled wells. This is not to
say that an increase in the royalty rates would not have a dramatic effect on the
industry, but that effect would likely come from changing the decision to drill or
not rather than the operating state of already drilled wells. Increasing royalty rates
that currently range from 5% to 35% (depending on the price, when the reserve was
discovered, and quantity produced) to 50% results in 3.7% less active wells, 20%
less production, and 20% more reserves in the case of gas after 12 years; and 8.5%
less active wells, 13% less production, and 15% more remaining reserves in the case
of oil.
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Figure 16: Forecast under Baseline and 50% Royalty Rate
91
6.3.9 Long Term Forecast
As can be seen in all of the forecasts, the trend over time is that the number
of wells that have been decommissioned increases. Extending the simulation out to
the next century illustrates that according to this trend, eventually all wells will be
decommissioned (Figure 17). This prediction comes with a large grain of salt that
the economy and regulatory regime is to remain as it has in the last eight years.
However this simulation also illustrates that by virtue of the dynamics themselves,
the industry will not remain as it has in the last eight years. Currently the industry
as a whole has more assets than liabilities, however the simulation shows that there
is a risk of not always having more active wells than inactive wells. The simulation
predicts that in less than 20 years, of the wells present in 2007, there will be more
inactive than active. The simulation does not include a prediction for new wells
drilled and so the change in the proportion of inactive to active wells will not be as
dramatic as the simulation suggests. The trend that results in all wells eventually
being decommissioned depends on funds for decommissioning to be available. Firms
not setting aside sufficient funds becomes an even more severe problem when the
stream of income from producing wells is no longer present. Nonetheless, assuming
that the parameters and transition probabilities remain the same, it would take over
100 years to have all of the wells present in 2007 decommissioned; the majority of
the inactive wells are never reactivated, and so it was not necessary for them to
remain inactive, potentially be polluting, only to be later decommissioned.
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Figure 17: Long-run Forecast for Wells in Subsample
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7 Conclusion
The decision that oil and natural gas producers make for the operating state
of their wells can be categorized as a classic example of an irreversible investment
under uncertainty. Restarting production or finally decommissioning a well is an
expensive endeavor and is made with uncertainty in future recovery technology and
prices. I show that this decision can be modeled by a real options formulation.
The operating decisions taken for a subsample of wells in Alberta can be replicated
by modeling well operators as dynamic optimizers with an annual discount rate of
about 22%. Within-sample goodness of fit tests show that the model is able to
closely predict actual operating choices. The model is further validated using an
out-of-sample prediction of decisions from data not used in the estimation of the
parameters.
The motivation of this dissertation was to determine the fate of inactive wells;
they could be either a blessing, if they are to be reactivated and contribute to our
energy supply, or they could be a curse, if they are never reactivated but must
undergo costly decommissioning. By having estimated the structural parameters
of a model for the optimal operating state, I predict how operating choices might
change under different conditions. The model predicts that a probable increase in
the profit from extracting is not enough to incite operators to reactivate wells, and
so it is not justified for the regulator to rely on increases in prices or recovery rates
to spur reactivation. Relying on technology improvements to reduce the reactivation
costs might be justified because the model predicts that lowering the reactivation
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cost will substantially increase reactivation. However, what a probable reduction in
reactivation costs might be is difficult to say because I do not observe the impact
of past technological improvements in reactivation as I do in the case of recovery
rates.
The socially optimal solution would be to account for the externalities asso-
ciated with leaving a well inactive, such as by implementing a Pigouvian tax on
inactive wells equal to the marginal damages to groundwater. The model predicts
that a tax on inactive wells would have the added benefit of increasing the number
of reactivated wells. In the case of oil the number of decommissioned wells is greater
than the number of reactivated wells after a Pigouvian tax. Setting the optimal tax
is difficult because unfortunately there is no study that I am aware of that puts a
price tag on damages from inactive wells.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Choice of Discount Factor
There was not a discount factor that resulted in the highest likelihood for all
groups. I choose a constant discount factor across all of the different well types.
I choose a discount factor of .80. Summing the log likelihoods of all well groups
for different fixed discount factors, a discount factor between .80 and .90 gives the
highest likelihood (Figure 18). Not all of the well group optimizations reached an
optimum before the iteration limit (of 1200) was met, and therefore to create the
Figures 19 to 20, if the iteration limit was reached and the log likelihood was more
than 4 times the average of the other log likelihoods, then I interpolated a log
likelihood from the results from the two closest discount factors. This had to be
done for 5 out of 259 of the optimizations.
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Figure 18: Effect of Using Different Discount Factors on Results from All Gas Wells
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Figure 19: Effect of Using Different Discount Factors on Results from Gas Wells in
“New” Pools
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Figure 20: Effect of Using Different Discount Factors on Results from Gas Wells in
“Old” Pools
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8.1.1 Example of Resulting Value Function
Figures 21 and 22 depict how the value of different decisions changes with
price and reserve size for four different well types of inactive wells in PSAC area
3. The value of continuing to idle an inactive well is displayed next to the value of
reactivating it. As expected, the value of each decision for each well increases with
prices and reserves. This is the case for both wells drilled in pools discovered before
1974 (“old”) and wells drilled in pools discovered in 1974 or after (“new”), wells
drilled in pools with other wells, and wells in pools of their own. In this example,
the value of a well in an “old” pool is greater than the value of a well in a “new”
pool in the case of single-well pools (Figures 21). It is not a surprise that wells in
“old” pools would be more valuable than wells in “new” pools, because pools that
are easier to extract from are also easier to find and hence were discovered earlier.
The royalty regime tries to account for this by requiring that a higher royalty is
paid for gas extracted from “old” pools. However, in this example, the value of a
well in an “old” pool is not greater than the value of a well in a “new” pool in the
case of wells in multi-well pools (Figures 22). Perhaps this is due to “old” pools
having been around longer and therefore have had more wells drilled in them. For
example, the average number of wells on a multi-well “old” gas pool in PSAC area
3 is 41.27 (26.21 for the whole province) compared to an average of 6.6 wells on
a multi-well “new” gas pool (4.96 for the whole province) on a multi-well “new”
gas pool. The model does not distinguish between a pool with 4000 wells and a


























































































































Figure 21: Value of leaving inactive and activating a 5 year old inactive gas well in


























































































































Figure 22: Value of leaving inactive and activating a 5 year old inactive gas well in











































































































Figure 23: Difference between value of activating and leaving inactive a 5 year old
inactive gas well in PSAC area 3 cluster 2 (in multi-well “new”(post-1974) pools
and “old”(pre-1974) pools)
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why multi-well “old” pools are valued less. At a certain price, the value of the well
increases more than at other prices. This nonuniform increase is not present when
the producer is myopic and the discount factor β is equal to zero. The value of
the well under any choice includes the probability of the making the choice and the
expected discounted profit from this choice. And so even the value of leaving the
well inactive includes the probability of reactivation in the next period. Then at a
price that it is profitable to extract, the probability of reactivation is higher and the
increase in the value of the well is larger. This also explains why the value function
of leaving the well idle is flatter than reactivating it. If left idle then the only reason
that higher prices and higher reserves will increase the value of the well is because
of the probability of reactivating in the future.
Each of the well groups has a threshold price and reserve size that above which
the value of reactivating the well is greater than leaving it idle, and below which
is less than leaving it idle. The difference in the value of reactivating the well and
leaving the well inactive is presented in Figures 23. The threshold price is higher
for multi-well pools than single-well pools which is expected.
There is an unknown location parameter that could be shifting the value of a
well up or down without changing the choice probabilities. Therefore the estimated
value of a given well cannot be interpreted immediately as the true value. However,
the shape of the value function and the relationship between the values of different
states remains the same.
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8.2 Determining When to Cluster
The well groups are broken down into clusters depending on the time invari-
ants (for gas: depth, initial pressure and density and for oil: initial pressure water
saturation, temperature and depth 30). The model was estimated with and with-
out clustering so that a likelihood ratio test could be used to determine whether
they should be clustered or not. This was done for each well group and the results
for whether the groups were clustered or not can be found in the Appendix Table
19. A more detailed look is shown for PSAC Area 3 gas wells, where clustering
improves the likelihood such that the null hypothesis that the group is homogenous
and should not be clustered is rejected (Table 18).
Table 18: To Cluster or Not to Cluster: Example Using PSAC Area 3 Gas Wells
Parameter Cluster Cluster Cluster Likelihood Marg.
1 2 1 & 2 Ratio Sig.
θ1 (C) 0.0816 (0.0305) 0.1590 (0.0772) 0.0559 (0.0194)
θ2 (C) 0.0002 (0.0001) 1.656e-7(9.259e-10) 8.358e-6(1.213e-5)
θ3 (C) 0.0035 (0.0139) 0.2686 (0.0015) 0.1042 (0.0514)
θ4 (M1) -1.9646 (0.0627) -1.6408 (0.2787) -1.4412 (0.0377)
θ5 (M1) -0.0086 (0.0019) -0.0004 (0.0064) -0.0100 (0.0025)
θ6 (M2) -0.6089 (0.0235) -0.6454 (0.0941) -1.2805 (0.0236)
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 1.5024 (0.0255) 1.8260 (0.8382) 6.0158 (0.0721)
θ8 (SC(2→1)) 3.1372 (0.0911) 3.2001 (0.9059) -8.2566 (0.1919)
θ9 (SC(2→1)) 0.0172 (0.0020) 0.0143 (0.0080) -0.6414 (0.0126)
No. Obs. 12944 703 13647
LL2 3110.9449 162.3341 3306.1562 65.7541 5.551e-16
Notes: These results are for determining whether wells in a multi-well “old” pool in PSAC area 3
should be further broken down into clusters. Standard errors are in parentheses (asymptotic
standard errors from the partial likelihood). The likelihood ratio test is performed for all well
groups. Parameters refer to cost specification 7.
30PSAC area 3 oil wells’ best results came when clustering was only done on water saturation,
and PSAC 4 only clustering was on initial pressure
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Table 19: Actual versus Predicted Choice Probabilities for All Well
Types
Fluid PSAC Single Royalty Cluster No. Obsv. Exp. Obsv. Exp.
Area Well Regime Obs. Pr(Act) Pr(Act) Pr(Inact) Pr(Inact)
Oil 3 No Third 1 737 0.6825 0.6833 0.3080 0.3071
Oil 3 No Third 2 7537 0.7080 0.7081 0.2858 0.2856
Oil 5 No Third 1 1686 0.6489 0.6474 0.3422 0.3432
Oil 5 No Third 2 801 0.6417 0.6416 0.3483 0.3484
Oil 4 No New 1 7550 0.5234 0.5228 0.4581 0.4586
Oil 4 No New 2 14219 0.5580 0.5578 0.4281 0.4283
Oil 3 No Old 1 15065 0.6188 0.6188 0.3708 0.3708
Oil 3 No Old 2 1765 0.5904 0.5901 0.4045 0.4048
Oil 4 No Old 1 14358 0.6502 0.6495 0.3375 0.3382
Oil 4 No Old 2 5327 0.5016 0.4618 0.4701 0.4820
Oil 5 No Old 1 6668 0.5195 0.5195 0.4741 0.4740
Oil 5 No Old 2 3817 0.5512 0.4839 0.4299 0.4443
Oil 7 No Old 1 1606 0.6239 0.6235 0.3667 0.3672
Oil 7 No Old 2 1847 0.5116 0.5111 0.4808 0.4814
Oil 4 Yes Third 1 175 0.6571 0.6631 0.3257 0.3204
Oil 4 Yes Third 2 529 0.6200 0.6198 0.3743 0.3745
Oil 5 Yes Third 1 611 0.7185 0.7176 0.2717 0.2725
Oil 5 Yes Third 2 390 0.7487 0.7496 0.2462 0.2453
Oil 2 Yes New 1 408 0.8358 0.8354 0.1642 0.1646
Oil 2 Yes New 2 564 0.8085 0.8016 0.1897 0.1894
Oil 3 Yes New 1 528 0.8163 0.8157 0.1837 0.1843
Oil 3 Yes New 2 349 0.8768 0.8748 0.1146 0.1165
Oil 4 Yes New 1 77 0.6494 0.6241 0.3506 0.3733
Oil 4 Yes New 2 123 0.6341 0.6351 0.3659 0.3649
Oil 3 Yes Old 1 53 0.6792 0.5533 0.3208 0.3724
Oil 3 Yes Old 2 52 0.6538 0.6552 0.3462 0.3448
Oil 5 Yes Old 1 59 0.9322 0.9352 0.0678 0.0648
Oil 5 Yes Old 2 87 0.6667 0.5679 0.3333 0.3509
Oil 1 No Third No 48 0.8125 0.8105 0.1875 0.1895
Oil 2 No Third No 1965 0.7746 0.7732 0.2178 0.2185
Oil 4 No Third No 6102 0.6188 0.6187 0.3704 0.3705
Oil 6 No Third No 15 0.4000 0.3982 0.6000 0.6018
Oil 7 No Third No 3395 0.7137 0.7138 0.2786 0.2785
Oil 2 No New No 3107 0.6112 0.6102 0.3833 0.3843
Oil 3 No New No 18677 0.6510 0.6509 0.3399 0.3400
Oil 5 No New No 6847 0.5772 0.5770 0.4082 0.4084
Oil 6 No New No 17 0.6471 0.6471 0.2941 0.2941
Oil 7 No New No 9057 0.6226 0.6223 0.3646 0.3647
Oil 1 No Old No 36 0 0 1 1
Oil 2 No Old No 4152 0.6197 0.6195 0.3719 0.3720
Oil 1 Yes Third No 30 0.6000 0.6088 0.4000 0.3910
Oil 2 Yes Third No 1292 0.7763 0.7714 0.2206 0.2236
Oil 3 Yes Third No 2068 0.7742 0.7739 0.2200 0.2203
Oil 6 Yes Third No 6 0.5000 0.5070 0.5000 0.4930
Oil 7 Yes Third No 3025 0.6846 0.6842 0.3107 0.3112
Oil 1 Yes New No 8 1 0.8750 0 0.1250
Oil 5 Yes New No 695 0.7698 0.7697 0.2273 0.2274
Oil 7 Yes New No 1608 0.7009 0.5969 0.2954 0.3256
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 19 – Continued
Fluid PSAC Single Royalty Cluster No. Obsv. Exp. Obsv. Exp.
Well Obs. Pr(Act) Pr(Act) Pr(Inact) Pr(Inact)
Oil 2 Yes Old No 177 0.6893 0.6897 0.3107 0.3103
Oil 4 Yes Old No 36 0.5278 0.4315 0.4722 0.5047
Oil 7 Yes Old No 543 0.5285 0.5282 0.4696 0.4701
Gas 3 No New 1 13842 0.7586 0.7575 0.2331 0.2340
Gas 3 No New 2 522 0.7759 0.7754 0.2222 0.2227
Gas 4 No New 1 5445 0.6505 0.6518 0.3412 0.3400
Gas 4 No New 2 1286 0.5086 0.5086 0.4798 0.4797
Gas 5 No New 1 414 0.6739 0.6748 0.3116 0.3109
Gas 5 No New 2 9440 0.6238 0.6249 0.3603 0.3594
Gas 7 No New 1 13704 0.6822 0.6826 0.3049 0.3046
Gas 7 No New 2 3492 0.7033 0.7082 0.2878 0.2836
Gas 2 No Old 1 4254 0.6718 0.6749 0.3209 0.3182
Gas 2 No Old 2 5424 0.7000 0.7035 0.2933 0.2908
Gas 3 No Old 1 12944 0.7451 0.7440 0.2458 0.2467
Gas 3 No Old 2 703 0.6714 0.6731 0.3186 0.3177
Gas 5 No Old 1 5649 0.4780 0.4783 0.5151 0.5148
Gas 5 No Old 2 6353 0.5649 0.5657 0.4140 0.4133
Gas 7 No Old 1 3605 0.6413 0.6419 0.3420 0.3415
Gas 7 No Old 2 5964 0.5867 0.5864 0.4079 0.4083
Gas 7 Yes New 1 5997 0.6797 0.6805 0.3148 0.3141
Gas 7 Yes New 2 1042 0.6727 0.6734 0.3225 0.3217
Gas 1 No New No 432 0.7824 0.7819 0.2106 0.2111
Gas 2 No New No 9569 0.7452 0.7451 0.2512 0.2515
Gas 6 No New No 11595 0.6091 0.6097 0.3746 0.3740
Gas 1 No Old No 3095 0.6847 0.6876 0.3073 0.3052
Gas 4 No Old No 10870 0.7454 0.7456 0.2468 0.2466
Gas 6 No Old No 3111 0.5188 0.5205 0.4455 0.4442
Gas 1 Yes New No 491 0.8921 0.8876 0.1079 0.1123
Gas 2 Yes New No 8527 0.8335 0.8342 0.1637 0.1631
Gas 3 Yes New No 12167 0.7805 0.7810 0.2145 0.2141
Gas 4 Yes New No 5539 0.7111 0.7116 0.2827 0.2824
Gas 5 Yes New No 11848 0.7091 0.7102 0.2830 0.2821
Gas 6 Yes New No 5717 0.6411 0.6414 0.3490 0.3488
Gas 1 Yes Old No 31 0.8387 0.8384 0.1613 0.1561
Gas 2 Yes Old No 371 0.7197 0.7167 0.2803 0.2822
Gas 3 Yes Old No 961 0.6691 0.6734 0.3247 0.3241
Gas 4 Yes Old No 302 0.6755 0.6768 0.3013 0.3009
Gas 5 Yes Old No 973 0.6023 0.6051 0.3864 0.3839
Gas 6 Yes Old No 187 0.5668 0.5677 0.4171 0.4165
Gas 7 Yes Old No 408 0.3873 0.3885 0.6005 0.5994
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8.3 Regression of Production
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals
from equation (8) have a standard normal distribution 66% of the time (there were
352 of these regressions, and an example of 16 are found in Figure 24).


























(a) “new” gas PSAC 3 single-well



























(b) “new” gas PSAC 3 multi-well





























(c) “old” gas PSAC 3 single-well




























(d) “new” gas PSAC 3 multi-well
Figure 24: Examples of the Distribution of the Residuals from Equation (8)
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8.4 Monte Carlo Experiment
A Monte Carlo experiment is used in order to test whether the program will be
able to estimate the structural parameters. This is an important test to determine
whether the program can indeed find the parameters that it is designed to. I only
test the ability of the program to estimate the parameters in the second stage of
the partial likelihood. The parameters from the first stage are set at estimates from
a well group (specifically, well group PSAC area 3 cluster 1 on a multi-well “new”
pool). I choose a value for each of the costs to be the “real” costs that I want to re-
cover. Using the “real” parameters, an artificial dataset is generated that contains no
more information than what we are faced with (that is, a dataset that only contains
information on the decision made and the current state). An observation consists
of price, remaining reserves, age, the endogenous state variable (current operating
state), and what decision was made for the future operating state. To generate the
Monte Carlo sample for a given well three state variables (price, reserve size, age
and current operating state) are randomly drawn from a distribution similar to that
of the real data. The observation of the decision is created by first solving the inner
fixed point for vθ(P,Q, s, d), given the “real” parameters. Then the probability of
choosing an action is obtained by equation (4). A uniformly distributed pseudo-
random number is drawn and depending on where it falls in intervals dictated by
the probabilities calculated from equation (4) I assign a decision to the data point.
This is done for a dataset of 10,000 observations. The nested fixed point algorithm
is able to back out the “real” parameters from the simulated dataset closely, even
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Table 20: Estimates from the Monte Carlo Experiment
Variable “Real” Estimated Standard Starting Lower Upper
Parameter Parameter Error Value Bound Bound
θ1 (C) 0.012 0.0135 (0.0018) 0.001 0 1
θ2 (C) 1.2e-4 1.1641e-4 (5.3e-006) 1e-007 0 0.01
θ3 (C) 0.12 0.1209 (0.0044) 0.01 0 1
θ4 (M1) 0.12 0.1288 (0.0286) 0.01 -16 16
θ5 (M1) 0.12 0.1137 (0.0109) 0.01 -1 1
θ6 (M2) 0.12 0.1093 (0.0158) 0.01 -16 16
θ7 (SC(1→2)) 0.12 0.1120 (0.0395) 0.01 -16 16
θ8 (SC(2→1)) 1.2 1.0435 (0.0747) 0.01 -16 16
θ9 (SC(2→1)) 0.12 0.1539 (0.0189) 0.01 -1 1
Notes: Parameters refer to cost specification 7. A sample size of 10,000. Stopping tolerance for
the Newton-Kantorovich iteration in the inner loop was set at 10−14.
when the starting point is far from the solution (Table 20).
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8.5 Glossary of Industry Terms
Bridge Plug A downhole tool that is located and set to isolate the lower part of the wellbore.
Bridge plugs may be permanent or retrievable, enabling the lower wellbore to be perma-
nently sealed from production or temporarily isolated from a treatment conducted on an
upper zone.a
Cap a well installing and closing a valve on the wellhead.a
Casing Steel pipe cemented in place during the construction process to stabilize the wellbore.
The casing forms a major structural component of the wellbore and serves several important
functions: preventing the formation wall from caving into the wellbore, isolating the different
formations to prevent the flow or crossflow of formation fluid, and providing a means of
maintaining control of formation fluids and pressure as the well is drilled.a
Cement plug A portion of cement placed at some point in the wellbore to seal it. d
Coiled Tubing Coiled tubing enables fluids to be pumped at any time regardless of the position
or direction of travel. This is a significant advantage in many applications. Installing an
electrical conductor or hydraulic conduit further enhances the capability of a coiled tubing
string and enables relatively complex intervention techniques to be applied safely.a
Crude Oil (Conventional) A mixture mainly of pentanes and heavier hydrocarbons that may
be contaminated with sulphur compounds and is recovered or is recoverable at a well from
an underground reservoir. It is liquid at the conditions under which its volume is measured
or estimated and includes all other hydrocarbon mixtures so recovered or recoverable except
raw gas, condensate, or crude bitumen.b
Crude Oil (Heavy) Crude oil is deemed to be heavy crude oil if it has a density of 900 kg/m3
or greater. b
Crossflow A condition that exists when two production zones with dissimilar pressure character-
istics are allowed to communicate during production. Reservoir fluid from the high-pressure
zone will flow preferentially to the low-pressure zone rather than up the production conduit
unless the production parameters are closely controlled.a
Cumulative Production The sum of production volumes from all prior years.b
Cyclic Steam Stimulation A method of thermal recovery in which a well is injected with steam
and then subsequently put back on production. A cyclic steam-injection process includes
three stages. The first stage is injection, during which a slug of steam is introduced into
the reservoir. The second stage, or soak phase, requires that the well be shut in for several
days to allow uniform heat distribution to thin the oil. Finally, during the third stage,
the thinned oil is produced through the same well. The cycle is repeated as long as oil
production is profitable.a
Density The mass or amount of matter per unit volume.b
Discovery Year The year when drilling was completed of the well in which the oil or gas pool
was discovered.b
Enhanced Recovery Method The third stage of hydrocarbon production during which sophis-
ticated techniques that alter the original properties of the oil are used. Enhanced oil recovery
can begin after a secondary recovery process or at any time during the productive life of an
oil reservoir. Its purpose is not only to restore formation pressure, but also to improve oil
displacement or fluid flow in the reservoir.a
Established Reserves Those reserves recoverable under current technology and present and
anticipated economic conditions specifically proved by drilling, testing, or production, plus
the portion of contiguous recoverable reserves that are interpreted to exist from geological,
geophysical, or similar information with reasonable certainty.b
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Extraction The process of liberating hydrocarbons (propane, bitumen) from their source (raw
gas, mined oil sands).b
Field The geographically defined area on which wells are drilled.b
Formations The fundamental unit of lithostratigraphy. A body of rock that is sufficiently dis-
tinctive and continuous that it can be mapped.a
Gas Raw gas, marketable gas, or any constituent of raw gas, condensate, crude bitumen, or crude
oil that is recovered in processing and is gaseous at the conditions under which its volume
is measured or estimated.b
Horizontal Well A subset of the more general term “directional drilling”, used where the de-
parture of the wellbore from vertical exceeds about 80 degrees. Because a horizontal well
typically penetrates a greater length of the reservoir, it can offer significant production
improvement over a vertical well.a
Hydraulic Pumping An artificial-lift system that operates using a downhole pump. A surface
hydraulic pump pressurizes crude oil called power oil, which drives the bottom pump.a
Initial Established Reserves Established reserves prior to the deduction of any production.b
Initial Oil or Gas in Place Estimated volume of oil or gas in place before any extraction, and
can be updated every year.b
Initial Pressure The reservoir pressure at the reference elevation of a pool upon discovery.b
Non-confidential pool when the one-year confidential status of the initial well has expired; 5
or more wells are cased for production; in the case of a gas pool, gas has been produced,
gathered and marketed; or the ERCB has designated it non-confidential on application by
the licensees.c
Packer A device that can be run into a wellbore with a smaller initial outside diameter that then
expands externally to seal the wellbore. Packers employ flexible, elastomeric elements that
expand.a
Plunger Lift An artificial-lift method principally used in gas wells to unload relatively small
volumes of liquid. An automated system mounted on the wellhead controls the well on
an intermittent flow regime. When the well is shut-in, a plunger is dropped down the
production string. When the control system opens the well for production, the plunger and
a column of fluid are carried up the tubing string. The surface receiving mechanism detects
the plunger when it arrives at surface and, through the control system, prepares for the
next cycle.a
Pool A subsurface oil accumulation. An oil field can consist of one or more oil pools or distinct
reservoirs within a single large trap.a A pool is the porous and permeable rock formation
that contains hydrocarbon, confined within impermeable rock or water.b
Porosity The effective pore space of the rock volume determined from core analysis and well log
data measured as a fraction of rock volume.b
Progressive Cavity Pump A type of a sucker rod-pumping unit that uses a rotor and a stator.
The rotation of the rods by means of an electric motor at the surface causes the fluid
contained in a cavity to flow upward.a
Recovery Factor The fraction of the oil or gas in place that can be extracted under current
technology and present and anticipated economic conditions.b
Remaining Established Reserves The initial established reserves less cumulative production
and surface loss.b
Saturation (Water) The fraction of pore space in the reservoir rock occupied by water upon
discovery.b
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Sour Gas A gas containing hydrogen sulfide, carbon dioxide or mercaptans, all of which are
extremely harmful.a
Sucker Rod Pumping An artificial-lift pumping system using a surface power source to drive
a downhole pump assembly. A beam and crank assembly creates reciprocating motion in
a sucker-rod string that connects to the downhole pump assembly. The pump contains a
plunger and valve assembly to convert the reciprocating motion to vertical fluid movement.
a
Surface Loss A summation of the fractions of recoverable gas that is removed as acid gas and
liquid hydrocarbons and is used as lease or plant fuel or is flared.b
Temperature The initial reservoir temperature upon discovery at the reference elevation of a
pool.b
Wellbore The borehole, including the openhole or uncased portion of the well.a
Zone Any stratum or sequence of strata that is designated by the ERCB as a zone.b
Source:
a Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary (online), 2009 Schlumberger Limited
(http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/default.cfm)
b Alberta’s Energy Reserves 2007 and Supply/Demand Outlook 2008-2017, ERCB [2008]
c Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations, Part 12.150(1) OGCR [2000]
d U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety & Health Administration
Oil and Gas Well Drilling and Servicing eTool Glossary of Terms.
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